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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Labor Supply Dynamics, Home Production, and Case-based Preferences 
 
by 
Michael Naaman 
 In this paper we examine models that incorporate CBDT.   In the first chapter, we 
will examine CBDT more thoroughly including a reinterpretation of the standard labor 
supply problem under a wage tax in a partial equilibrium model where preferences 
exhibit characteristics of CBDT.  In the second chapter, we extend the labor supply 
decision under a wage tax by incorporating a household production function.  Utility 
maximization by repeated substitution is applied as a novel approach to solving dynamic 
optimization problems.  This approach allows us to find labor supply elasticities that 
evolve over the life cycle.  In the third chapter, CBDT will be explored in more depth 
focusing on its applicability in representing people's preferences over movie rentals in the 
Netflix competition.  This chapter builds on the theoretical model introduced in chapter 1, 
among other things, expressing the rating of any customer movie pair using the ratings of 
similar movies that the customer rated and the ratings of the movie in question by similar 
customers.  We will also explore in detail the econometric model used in the Netflix 
competition which utilizes machine learning and spatial regression to estimate customer's 
preferences.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents 
 
Adam Naaman 
 
and 
 
Pamela Naaman 
 
for all their love and support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Making the Case for Case Based Utility Functions……………………………………1 
2. Home Production……………………………………………………………………...11 
3. The Netflix Competition………………………………………………………………84 
References…………………………………………………………………………...….112 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1:  MAKING THE CASE FOR CASE BASED UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
In classic economic modeling, economists assume that preferences are an inherit 
trait of the decision maker.  We generally assume that a decision maker knows their 
preferences over all possible goods and we can represent this preference structure with a 
quasi-concave, differentiable, utility function. 
  In certain circumstances, it is natural to develop a model of preferences evolving 
over time based on past experiences.  This is referred to as “case based decision theory” 
(CBDT) and allows one to model preferences based on recollections of trade-offs, 
decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions that have played out in the past.  Formally, 
if we let A be the set of acts that are available to the decision maker from some decision 
problem p and let  Mr)p,(a,=c   be the triple consisting of the act, a, chosen in a 
decision problem, p, and the outcome, r, that resulted from the act, then for any given 
subset of memories, I, we can express preferences over acts conditional on those 
memories, which we denote by }{ I .  If the preference relation satisfies certain axioms 
we can express the preference relation over acts with a utility function given by 



Mc
q)u(r)s(p,U(a)        where  r)q,(a,=c   
So the term ),( qps is the similarity over the decision problem given that act, a, was 
chosen.  But we may also have a situation where there is similarity between act decision 
problem pairs.  For example, if our set of acts consists of buying or selling a stock and 
our set of decision problems consists of buying the stock when the price is high or low, 
then we may have a situation where "buying the stock when the price is low" is more 
similar to "selling the stock when the price is high" than "selling the stock when the price 
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is low".  Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) provide axioms that allow a generalization that 
includes similarity over the pair of decision problems and acts by 



Mc
b))u(r)(q,a),w((p,U(a)   where c=(q,b,r) 
To see the usefulness of cased based utility models, compare this to the standard 
approach in a classical partial equilibrium tax model, which will be revisited in chapter 2.  
Assume we have a representative agent with preferences over consumption, c, and 
leisure, L, which are both normal goods.  The agent has a finite amount of time, which 
can be used for leisure or labor.   Without loss of generality we can normalize the 
endowment of time to 1, so that h is the percentage of time devoted to labor and 1-h is 
used for leisure.  Furthermore, assume that the labor is used in a constant returns to scale 
technology that produces the consumption good.  Suppose there is also a government that 
levies a labor tax, , which will raise revenue, hT  .  Rogerson (2009) assumes that the 
government makes a lump sum transfer to the representative agent in the amount of the 
tax revenue, T.    The reason for this assumption is that we are only interested in the 
substitution effects.  By making the lump sum transfer back to the agent, we keep wealth 
constant.  The model can be written as  
 Lcu ,max  st. 
      
10
1
)1(



h
hL
Thc 
 
 In equilibrium hc  , but the agent maximizes utility taking T to be constant.  Of course, 
we must take the leap of faith that the agent takes the lump sum transfer, T, as a constant 
and doesn't realize that a change in h will produce a change in the lump sum transfer.     
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However, if we model this tax problem under the guise of a case based utility 
problem, then there is a much more fluid interpretation.  In this case the choice of labor 
supply, h, will serve as our act.  The decision problem in this instance is simply the tax 
rate that the representative agent faces.  Finally the result, r, for any pair  h,  is the 
resulting consumption, c, and leisure, L, which is realized due to the act h.   
The maximization problem can be written as a case based decision problem based 
on memories of different decision problems 
       


Mc
i 1,-1u,h,,wp)|U(a iiiii hThh   
If the tax rate changes, the decision maker must decide how to change their labor supply, 
so the only thing that changes for the decision maker is the tax rate and possibly the labor 
supply. One can think of this similarity measure as being a kernel that puts extreme 
weight on the new tax rate, so it acts as an approximate delta function with only results 
that were close to the new tax rates are kept, so we have  
    




i
iii
h
hTh 1,-1uhh,smax i  
  Since iT  is a result of the act that the government takes to redistribute the tax 
revenue back to the representative agent, the agent doesn’t take into account the fact that 
hT ii   because the tax return is result of an act of another party and not the result of the 
act taken by the representative agent, so transfers as exogenous.  This will prove to be 
important when savings are included in the model because savings will be considered as 
transfers from the previous period.  As a general rule, it seems reasonable to model 
experiences that are closer in time as being more relevant which gives 
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    




i
hTh i 1,-1uhh,s)U(h, i
i
 
  If symmetry of the similarity function is assumed, then it is irrelevant whether we 
maximize over h or over the sequence   ihi 1 , so an equivalent utility 
maximization problem is given by 
 
 
  



T
i
iii
Tih
hTh
i 1
i
1
1,-1umax   
 This gives rise to the standard dynamic optimization problem, but the CBDT 
forces the restriction 

i
i1   
If the main interest of study is the effect of a small change in the tax rate from a 
rate that has been constant for a very long time, then this approach will be a good 
approximation to the problem.  From this point, the problem can be solved for different 
tax rates and meaningful comparisons can be made about changes in labor supply. This is 
a much more natural approach that will be considered empirically in chapter 2. 
Consider another example that will motivate our approach in chapter 3. Suppose a 
decision maker, 1DM , who has a complete ordering of preferences for N movies.  
Assume we ask the person to partition the movies into two groups such that all movies 
from group G are weakly preferred to group B and we ask them to report a 1 for the 
movies in group G, and a 0 for the bad movies in group B. Next we take a random draw, 
z, from the N movies and we ask her to predict the quality of the movie and we give 
incentives so that she will seek to minimize her prediction error.  If we make the draw 
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with replacement, reporting the proportion of good movies to bad movies will maximize 
her utility. 
  Clearly, 1DM  will try to make high quality predictions and the estimate is just the 
expected utility. 
         
N
|G|
 p(y)p)U-(1(x)pU(z)EU 111      where (x)U1 =1  and (y)U1 =0 
 In this case, there is no need for the case based utility representation; however, if we 
make the draws without replacement, then over time 1DM  learns about the distribution 
of the remaining good movies, so her utility over the precision of the estimates will be 
maximized at the estimator that minimizes the MSE.  At draw t+1, she can improve on 
the naive estimator p with 
  t
t
tt p
tN
utG
zEU 1
1
1
1
11
||



  
where tu1 is the mean utility up to time t and  tiz it  1,11  
Since we are trying to predict the good movies, we can set the represent this as a 
weighted average of past cases by using the number of good movies, tG1 , and bad 
movies, tB1 , up to time t, so that 1
||
),(
1

tt G
G
qps  if the movie is good and 
1
||
),(
1

tt B
B
qps  if the movie is bad.  Of course, the sum of ),( tqps up to time t is N-t, 
we must standardize by the similarity factors, which gives  
  t
t
tt p
tN
GG
zEU 1
1
1
1
11
||



 . 
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 This has the nice interpretation as being the conditional expected utility given the past.  
Also notice that for any time t realization of a good movie increases the bad movie 
weight and decreases the good movie weight because there is a relatively higher chance 
of getting a bad movie in the future. 
Assume we add another decision maker, 2DM , with a utility function over 
movies, 2U .  To keeps things simple, assume both parties have access to all of the 
reported utilities and that both decision makers have the same preference structure.  The 
information set has expanded to include 2DM , so the conditional expectation will be 
given by have 
 
  tt
tt
tt
tttt
ttt
pp
tN
GGG
pp
tN
GGGGG
zEU
21
21
21
2121
21
1
11
1
)|(|
||
 






 
for some  1,0 .  if we allow the decision makers to have different preferences, then 
we can take the correlation, t , between the two decision makers' ratings, which will be 
an estimate of the common good movies for both of the decision makers up to time t. For 
example, if the two decision makers are perfectly correlated, then the second decision 
maker faces no uncertainty about the quality of the movie. However, we could have 
perfect correlation up to time t with differing preferences at time t+1, so it is not clear 
how DM1 would use this imperfect information.  If 1DM  just takes a weighted average, 
then 
        211122111 1]1[))(| ppapEazUzUEE tttt    
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 So our estimate of 1DM  is biased, unless 1 or 21 pp  , which violates our 
assumption.  Of course, we could demean the report of 2DM  so 
  121122111 )])(1([)]])(|[[ ppapEazUzUEE ttttt    
The estimate is still biased unless 1 and it is unclear how to find  .  However, if we 
use the best linear predictor based on the estimates of 1DM about 2DM , then we will be 
minimizing the MSE over unbiased estimators, so the utility estimator will be  
t
t
t
tttt pxpxzUzEU
2
2
11
1
22
1
11
)(
))(|(



  
 The second part of this term involves the standardized rating of the second user, the 
correlation, and the average deviation from the mean of 2DM .  By standardizing the 
report of 2DM , we are measuring how much on average 2DM  deviates from her mean.  
Then we multiply by the correlation, which is our estimate of similarity, and multiply by 
standard deviation of 1DM  to see how much 1DM  will deviate from her mean given 
2DM . 
 We can reformulate the problem into the CBDT framework.  For any case c we 
have the act, a, which is the reported rating of movie p and the resulting utility function 
over acts is given by 



Mc
b)u(r)w(a,p)|U(a  where c=(q,b,r) 
Unfortunately, we don’t know the decision maker's utility, but we do have the 
reported utility, )|(
~
paU .  Presumably, the decision maker is trying to reveal her 
preferences, so if the decision maker gets utility  pru ,  from act a in decision problem p, 
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then we can assume p)|,(r)U
~
-u(r)f(|p)|U(a   where f is some increasing function so 
that the decision maker maximizes her utility be reporting her utility as truthfully as 
possible relative to her other reports.  If we restrict our attention to cases where the 
decision maker actually reported a utility, then whenever a is chosen, we have 



Mc
cUqpspaU )(
~
),()|(  
It can be shown that the solution of this maximization problem is to report 
]|)([)(
~
MpuEpU  .  This means our similarity function should be a probability 
measure, but the weighting matrix is only unique up to a scale factor.  This implies we 
need to estimate a model of the form 
  UWI
~
)(  
Of course, that assumes we had the weighting matrix in hand, but we can estimate 
W assuming we can adequately represent the memories that are being conditioned upon.  
In order to do this, we use some distance measure, like correlation, and use this distance 
measure to estimate W with a nonparametric regression.    We assume that any distance 
measure that preserves the similarity ordering will be the same asymptotically, but 
proving this is beyond the scope of our paper.   
Since this person has never faced this decision problem, we would like to gain 
insight about it.  For instance, in our last example, we could set 
t
t
t
t
pxxtaIcI
xtaawcaw
2
2
1
),,()(
)),,(,(),(




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Using other peoples reported utility is justified because  cI  represents the 
information the decision maker has for case c, which could be information about some 
other decision maker that is relevant.  Information about similar decision makers is 
fundamentally different, so we would like to restrict the cases, ic , to be positive weights. 
For example, if a good friend loved some movie, we might take that into account in our 
decision about what rating to assign that movie.  Suppose the movie was a musical and 
the decision maker hates musicals; but since her friend loved the movie, the decision 
maker might be inclined to give the movie a higher rating because it was a high quality 
musical. 

 

n
i
i
Mc
i cIcawqbUcawpIaU
i1
)(),()|(),(),|(  
If this new specification can still represent the decision makers' preferences, then it must 
be the case that our estimating matrix is a linear combination of the true weighting 
matrix, which means we must scale the estimated weighting matrix. 
  Our approach, which will be explained in more detail in chapter 3, for scaling the 
weighting matrix, is to assume the error is normal and perform maximum likelihood on 
the model 
    UIWWII )()( 2211  where ),0(~ IN  
In order for this model to be identified, W must be invertible.   To ensure this is to 
normalize the rows of W1 and W2 one and then restrict λ1+λ2<1.  This allows us to 
partition the model into the similar cases for the decision maker and similar decision 
makers for this decision problem.  Since our weights are positive and sum to unity, then 
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1  and 2  can be interpreted as evidence for the expected utility given similar decision 
problems. Finally, from a statistical perspective, the model is symmetric in movies and 
users, so apriori there is no reason to expect the estimates to be different, but our model 
shows such a stark contrasts between the models that it gives evidence for the case based 
utility over similar chosen decision problems.  
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CHAPTER 2:  HOME PRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 Traditionally economists have been very interested in the labor leisure decision 
choices that consumers make when faced with various tax rates.  Prescott (2004) argues 
that differences in labor tax rates account for the differences in observed labor hours 
across countries.  However, Ragan (2005) finds that countries in continental Europe with 
low levels of market work also tend to have high levels of time devoted to home 
production as compared with the US.  This result indicates that it might be helpful to 
examine the problem by taking into account labor utilized in home production as well as 
market labor in the labor supply problem. 
 The following table shows the hours worked for various OECD economies 
relative to US labor hours.   This table shows dramatic differences in labor across 
countries with the economies of Europe working far less than the US.  One possible 
explanation of these differences might be differences in labor tax rates across countries.  
Mcdaniel (2006), using data on 15 OECD countries from 1950-2003, finds that the 
effective average labor tax rate in the countries with the highest market labor supply is 
around 30% and 50% in the countries with a relatively low market labor supply.  We will 
use these results as our bench mark for comparing the change in market labor supply for a 
change in tax rates from 30% to 50%. 
 
 
Country Average effective labor hours worked relative to the 
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tax rate US in 2006 
Japan 32.6 1.02 
New Zealand 40.6 1.00 
Canada 40.3 .98 
Ireland 44.8 .98 
Australia 29.6 .96 
Portugal 44.2 .96 
Denmark 62.1 .93 
Switzerland 40.6 .93 
Sweden 63.2 .91 
Finland 62.1 .90 
Greece 49.9 .90 
UK  36.5 .90 
Spain 46.0 .88 
Austria 47.3 .81 
Norway 58.0 .81 
Netherlands 59.6 .77 
Belgium 57.0 .73 
France 57.2 .73 
Germany 50.7 .73 
Italy 55.4 .70 
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 As we can see from the table, the European countries, with the exception of 
Ireland, do not work as much as the other OECD countries.  However, there is 
heterogeneity within Europe as well because we can see that many of the Northern 
European countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, have higher tax rates and 
higher labor hours relative to their Western European counterparts, such as France, 
Germany, and Italy.  It appears that there may be more to these differences than simply 
tax rates.  For example, if we run a simple regression with the data in the table above, 
gives the following results 
   
iiih  
0901.0719.
ln305.247.3ln  
where ih  is the average number of hours worked per week in country i  and i  is an 
estimate of the average tax rate in country i .  Prescott (2004) argues that tax rates are the 
main determinant of the differences in labor supply for G7 countries.  The simple 
regression confirms the importance of the tax rate in the role of labor supply, but the poor 
fit of the model ( 35.2 R ) indicates that the model lacks explanatory power.    
 As an alternative to the Prescott model, Rogerson (2009) assumes a representative 
agent has preferences over consumption, c, and leisure, L, which are both normal goods.  
The agent has a finite amount of time, which can be used for leisure or labor.   Without 
loss of generality we can normalize the endowment of time to 1, so that h is the 
percentage of time devoted to labor and 1-h is used for leisure.  Furthermore, assume that 
labor is used in a constant returns to scale technology that produces the consumption 
good.  Suppose there is also a government that levies a labor tax, , which will raise 
revenue, hT  .  Rogerson assumes that the government makes a lump sum transfer to 
14 
 
the representative agent in the amount of the tax revenue, T, in order to examine the 
substitution effects.  By making the lump sum transfer back to the agent, we keep wealth 
constant.  The model can be written as  
)1,(max
01
hcu
h


 
st. c Th  )1(   
In equilibrium hc  , but the agent maximizes utility taking T to be constant.  As an 
example, consider the following maximization problem. 
     11
1
1
1lnmax
1
01









 hTh
h
 
The first order conditions are given by 
 
0
)1(
)1(
1
)1(










hTh
 
Substituting the equilibrium condition hT   into the FOC allows us to establish the 
following relationship in equilibrium 
  

)1(1
)1(
h
h




 
In general there will be no closed solution, but it can be shown that an increase in the tax 
rate results in a decrease in h and an increase in leisure, which is just 1-h.  The magnitude 
of these changes will be determined in large part by the agent’s taste for leisure, which is 
controlled by .  If we restrict our attention to small integer values of  , then a closed 
form solution can be recovered for labor supply, which can be seen in the table below 
labor supply in equilibrium for a given     
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 




1
)1(*h  
0 





1
)1(*h  
1 
 
 


















1
14
11
12
)1(
1*h  
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 As we can see the solution to the maximization problem becomes progressively 
more complicated as   increases, but it is interesting to note that without any tax the 
labor supply is decreasing as   get larger.   
However, it is possible to examine the comparative statics of such a model, first 
calibrate the model to match the US economy.  Following McDaniel (2006) we set the 
tax rate to .3, furthermore, we assume that in equilibrium 
3
1
h  for the US economy.  As 
a reference, if we assume people average 8 hours of sleep a night, then there will be 119 
waking hours a week devoted to labor or leisure and a 40 hour work week is roughly 1/3 
of that amount. The specification of these two values allows us to determine the 
corresponding value of   in order to calibrate the model to have features similar to the 
US economy.    
Rogerson (2009) uses a calibrated version of  to calculate the time in the labor 
market associated with a tax rate of .5 relative to that in the equilibrium of the US 
calibrated model with a tax rate of .3.  The results are given in the table below. 
The Ratio of Labor at the New Equilibrium   
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with a 50% Tax Rate Relative to a 30% 
Tax rate in the Old Equilibrium 
.76 .5 
.79 1 
.84 2 
.9 5 
.94 10 
.97 20 
 
As we can see from the table, the labor supply becomes more inelastic as   grows larger.  
As an alternative to this approach, we can attempt to calculate the labor supply elasticity 
directly.   
 We first redefine the first order conditions as an implicit function of labor supply 
and tax rates  
 
0
)1(
)1()1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
),( 
















hhhTh
hF  
By the concavity of u, 02 F which means we can apply the implicit function theorem 
1
12
2
1
1
1
1
1
)1(
)1()1(
)1(
/




























hh
hh
h
F
Fh 




 
where the second equality uses the fact that the FOC must satisfy 


)1(1
)1(
h
h




.  
The Marshallian labor supply elasticity, Mmarkete , is given by 
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


















hh
hh
h
eMmarket





1
1
1
)(  
The expression indicates Mmarkete  depends entirely on .  To see this, notice that 


 


 1
lim
0
M
markete  and 0lim 

M
markete

 which is consistent with the result in Rogerson 
(2009), in that there is very little change in market work as   increases.  This is intuitive 
as   controls the importance of leisure to the representative agent.  Another advantage of 
this approach is that we can derive a reasonable estimate for  .   
Based on the simply estimated relationship above we can solve for   for any 
country given their tax rate and labor supply.  Since  
   
iiih  
0901.0719.
ln305.247.3ln  
then since M
i
i
i
i
i
i e
h
h
h









305.
ln
ln
 we can derive a corresponding   for any 
country given.   For example, if we assume 
3
1
h  and 3.  for the US then assuming 
our model is correctly specified and countries are homogenous, then 75. ;  however, if 
we repeat this for all of the countries we find a range from .75 to 11 for implied values of 
 .  Rogerson (2009) points out that the differences in labor supply between the US and 
Western Europe could be accounted for by this model if 1 , but the implied   for the 
western European countries is far greater than 1 as the table below indicates.   
Country Implied     
Japan 1.07 
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New Zealand 2.38 
Canada 2.4 
Ireland 3.3 
Australia 0.74 
Portugal 3.27 
Denmark 9.47 
Switzerland 2.65 
Sweden 10.35 
Finland 9.92 
Greece 5.12 
UK  1.97 
Spain 4.17 
Austria 5.07 
Norway 9.27 
Netherlands 10.80 
Belgium 10.11 
France 10.21 
Germany 7.14 
Italy 9.8 
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We would expect that these implied values of   should be clustered around the 
some value of  , but the vast variation indicates that there is probably some variation 
amongst different countries. 
In the present context leisure is simply all activities that occur outside the market 
place.  This is problematic because any data that we have is inherently based on market 
information.  If we have information on prices and quantities demanded, we can recover 
the agent's preferences; however, in the case of leisure, the relative price of leisure 
compared to other goods is unobservable.  If we put more structure on the concept of 
leisure, then the problem becomes more tractable. 
 Suppose people produce at home a subset of their consumption goods more 
efficiently than the market place (Becker, 1965).  For instance, it is far cheaper to cook a 
high quality steak at home than purchasing it at a restaurant.  However, the keyword is 
"cheaper"; the consumer knows when it is beneficial to cook the steak as opposed to 
eating out.  Unfortunately, it is very difficult for the econometrician to measure this 
notion of "cheaper" and thus the econometrician may not be able to measure leisure in its 
most general context.  However, one may still view home production choices as suitable 
proxy for a substantial portion of the waking day spent away from traditional market-
based labor activities.   
 Several studies offer insight into the differences in labor supply decisions between 
the US and European countries.  Freeman and Schettkat (2005) report that time spent in 
home production in European countries is about 20% greater than in the US.  Burda 
(2008) reaches a similar conclusion that Europeans spend 15% to 20% more time in 
home production in addition to differences in leisure of about 15%.   Intuitively we would 
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expect that countries with higher labor tax rates have a smaller market labor supply for 
those goods which can be more easily produced outside the market, i.e. cooking at home 
instead of eating out at a restaurant.  Studies by Davis and Henrekson (2004) and 
Freeman and Schettkat (2005) find evidence for this intuition.  It seems reasonable to 
assume that the smaller market labor supply of Europe could be due to increased leisure 
time in Europe and increased home production, and thus these two factors should be 
considered separately in any time allocation model.  
  Adding home production to a model can account for the disparity in labor supply 
between the US and Europe.  Following Becker (1965), we assume there is a home 
production function, f , that takes as inputs goods, g , and time, 2h , with an output that 
is the consumption good so that  
 
 
1
1
,
21
1
2



Lhh
Thg
hgfc
  
where L is leisure time and 1h  is the proportion of time devoted to market labor.  Here g  
plays a similar role as before as the after tax labor revenue plus the lump sum tax that the 
consumer can use in the home production process along with the home production labor 
supply, 2h , to produce the final consumption good. 
For example, a meal at home requires some labor income to buy ingredients and 
time in order to cook a meal at home.  As in Rogerson (2009), we assume that the home 
production process will be given by 
    /12)1( hgc   
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where  10    and 1 so that the home production function will be a CES function 
exhibiting constant returns to scale.  The new utility maximization program is thus given 
by 
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After substituting in the equilibrium condition 1hT  , The FOC for this model will be 
given by the following system of equations 
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where   is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the constraint on the two types of labor.  It 
can be shown that any solution of this system must be in interior solution with 0 .   
 Rogerson (2009) utilizes a similar calibration process as before.  He assumes a tax 
rate of .3 to represent the US economy with market labor given by 
3
1
1 h  and home 
production labor given by 
4
1
2 h .  The estimates for home and market labor are 
supported by the work of Francis and Ramsey (2007).  Once we have these values set for 
the US economy in equilibrium, we can back out values for   and   for any given 
values of   and  .  This allows us to examine the change in market labor, home labor, 
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and leisure when the tax rate is changed from .3 to .5.  The tables below give the results 
from Rogerson (2009)   
  
market 
labor  1h  
5.  1  2  5  10  20  
0  .76 .79 .81 .83 .84 .85 
4.  .69 .71 .73 .74 .75 .75 
5.  .66 .67 .68 .70 .70 .70 
6.  .60 .61 .62 .63 .63 .64 
 
We can see from the table above that as   becomes larger leisure becomes less 
important and market labor increases for a fixed   due to the substitution of leisure to 
market hours.  Similarly as   becomes larger for a fixed   we see that market labor 
decreases as there is a substitution from market labor to home labor and that decrease is 
by much more than the 20% raise in taxes.  
home 
labor  2h  
5.  1  2  5  10  20  
0  1.07 1.10 1.14 1.17 1.18 1.19 
4.  1.21 1.25 1.27 1.30 1.31 1.32 
5.  1.28 1.32 1.34 1.37 1.38 1.38 
6.  1.40 1.40 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.47 
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As one would expect, as   becomes larger in the table above, leisure becomes 
less important and home labor increases for a fixed  .  There is a substitution of leisure 
to home labor and market labor.  Similarly as   becomes larger for a fixed   we see that 
now home labor increases as there is a substitution from market labor to home labor and 
for 0  we see a corresponding increase in home labor supply that is also greater than 
the 20% increase in taxes. 
 
leisure 
 211 hh   
5.  1  2  5  10  20  
0  1.14 1.10 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.01 
4.  1.11 1.08 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.01 
5.  1.10 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 
6.  1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 
 
 From the final table in this series, we can see that leisure is inelastic as all changes 
in leisure are less than the 20% raise in taxes, furthermore, for large   the change in 
taxes barely affects leisure independent of   which means the decrease in market labor 
goes almost entirely to home labor.  This intuitively makes sense because the consumer is 
using home production to evade the tax levied by the government.  This is a simple, but 
relatively effective approach to the comparative statics problem, however, we can say 
little more about the problem.   
 First reconsider the first order conditions from the maximization problem 
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It should be noted that when 1 , we will have a corner solution, which is given by 
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where H is the Heaviside step function, so assume 1  for the rest of the analysis. 
Since there is a common term for both equations at an interior solution, we can 
substitute the first equation into the second to get the following relationship 
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This means 1h  and 2h  must satisfy A
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Market labor is a function of only leisure and the model parameters.  We can also find the 
optimal leisure choice as a function of market labor, which is given by 
1
1
221 )1(1)1(11 hAhAhhL
  
Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution for the choices of labor and 
leisure, but the implicit function theorem always allows us to find the derivative of the 
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demand for labor and leisure with respect to the tax rate.  The FOC are satisfied if and 
only if  
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Since these two functions are constant for all tax rates, then their derivatives must be 
zero, which means we must solve the following system of equations 
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After a good deal of algebra, it can be shown that the market labor supply elasticity is 
given by 
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where 
D
x
)1( 

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  and MHmarkete  is the Marshallian elasticity with home production.  Since 
x doesn't depend on  , we can see that the home production parameter, , is a first order 
effect while the leisure parameter,  , is a second order effect.  To see this fact more 
clearly, notice that for large    
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The effect of   is essentially washed out if it is large and most of the elasticity is 
determined by the   parameter.   
If we turn our attention to home labor, we can take advantage of the relationship 
between market labor and home labor writing  
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This allows us to express home labor supply elasticity, MH eehom , in terms of market labor 
supply elasticity which gives 
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 As noted previously 1  at an interior solution, so market labor is always more 
elastic than home labor and the difference between the two elasticities depends only on 
the tax rate and the home production parameter,  .  This makes sense because a 
consumer will respond to a tax increase by substituting market labor for home labor and 
leisure.  
The home production model will have a labor supply elasticity at least as large as 
the model without home production.  In general if we are modeling the price elasticity of 
apples and we add a substitute for apples to the model, then the new price elasticity of 
apples should be at least as large in the new model that has more substitutes for apples.  
More formally take the total derivative of the time endowment equation for the home 
production model 
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In the home production model 02 
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that that elasticity of substitution between the two types of consumption is greater than 
the wage elasticity. This is important because it means that  
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All other things being equal, home production is a parameter in the standard model which 
means that 02 
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, so in the standard model without home production 
 







 1
hhL
 
The intuition behind this result is that a tax increase in the home production model 
implies labor must go down to allow home production and leisure to increase.  While in 
the standard model, any decrease in labor goes directly to leisure.  Implicitly we have 
assumed that income effect is the same in both models, which holds for the Hicks 
elasticity, but not the Marshallian elasticity.  So our model predicts that the Hicks 
elasticity will be larger in the home production model, but income effects can muddle this 
relation between the two models.  This simple model demonstrates the importance of 
non-market labor.  Taxes create a market distortion in the labor market, but they also 
affect home production and leisure, which need to be taken into account.  
Leisure in its most general form cannot be estimated from market data.  However, 
in this simple model, home production will dominate "regular leisure".  It is not 
reasonable to assume that we can measure a person's enjoyment of a nice glass of wine 
spent with her family.  But we can measure the tradeoff between eating at home as 
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opposed to eating at a restaurant and that tradeoff can be measured by the time devoted to 
restaurant dining as opposed to home dining. 
In order to identify the role of taxes and home production on labor supply, we 
need to move to a dynamic setting to see the how labor supply and home production 
responds to changes in effective tax rates.  Moving to the dynamic setting, assume that at 
time t  market consumption is given by tc market labor supply is given by mth , market 
labor supply is given by tL , and hourly wage given by tw .  Ghez and Becker (1975) 
present a dynamic labor supply problem where the individual solves  
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where 0I  is the initial exogenous income,   is the discount factor, r  is the interest rate, 
and tH  is the time endowment.  In the static case, we rescaled the time endowment to 
unity without loss of generality because there is only 24 hours in a day, but now we insist 
on explicitly modeling the time endowment because we are going to  control for basic 
functions such as sleep and personal care which can vary across individuals and across 
time.  So now tH will be the time endowment that can be allocated to market labor and 
leisure.  
In the classic work by Ghez and Becker (1975), a synthetic cohort is created and 
the resulting labor supply equation is given by 
  itctctctct wwhh    11 lnlnlnln  
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where cthln  is the average of the log of labor supply for all people in the 3-year age 
cohort.  The result of this regression gives 
  itctctctct wwhh   11 lnln282.002.lnln  
Using our data, I run a similar regression, but the table below shows the estimate of   
for all data up to that year, so we can see how the estimate changes as we add more data 
year   
1976 -0.12875 
1985 -0.12923 
2003 0.013917 
2004 0.184585 
2005 0.178054 
2006 0.189466 
2007 0.212118 
2008 0.254941 
2009 0.241251 
2010 0.258599 
 
The first thing to notice is that it takes about four years of data before the estimate begins 
to stabilize.  In the dynamic setting MaCurdy estimates a labor equation in a 2SLS setting 
where the wage is treated as endogenous 
  ititititit wwhh    11 lnlnlnln  
In this model the change in wages is considered endogenous, so family 
background variables, age, education, interaction between age and education, and dummy 
variables for time are used as instrumental variables.  This result of the 2SLS estimation 
is 
  ititititit wwhh   11 lnln23.009.lnln  
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Since MaCurdy had a true panel, we must create a synthetic cohort, but the results are 
similar 
year   
1976 -1.58999 
1985 -0.16145 
2003 0.108653 
2004 0.108003 
2005 0.082572 
2006 0.056722 
2007 0.155133 
2008 0.184813 
2009 0.155247 
 
 It is usually assumed in the macroeconomics literature that the utility function is 
separable in consumption and leisure, which is to say the utility function admits a 
representation of the form )()( mtmt hvcuU  , further discussion of this representation 
can be found in Prescott (2006).   
 For example, Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000) set  mtmt hhv )(  which results 
in the following dynamic optimization problem  
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One of the benefits of this functional form is that consumption will not appear in 
the first order conditions for labor supply which are given by 
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Rearranging and taking the logarithm of both sides, we have a feasible estimating 
equation given by 
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 Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000) only had cross sectional data, so they follow 
Ghez and Becker (1975) by creating a synthetic cohort that creates a pseudo panel data 
set.  In order to create the synthetic cohort, the relevant variables are averaged for all 
people of the same age, so our regression equation becomes 
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where mathln  is the mean of the logarithm of hours of market work for all individuals of 
age a in period t .  Also note that a  has replaced t  because age represents the number of 
periods that the individual has been solving the dynamic optimization problem, but it is a 
bit unreasonable to assume that individuals have been optimizing since birth, so age in 
this context begins when the first cohort is created which is 22 in this case.   
 It is further assumed that the data generating process follows a balanced growth 
path.  The balanced growth path assumption means that  
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where g  is the growth rate of consumption.   This allows the regression equation to be 
written as  
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Unfortunately, this model is not identified when 1  which is a relevant value, 
but they do find that the Frisch labor supply elasticity is 0.146. 
In order to capture a more realistic model of labor decisions, the model is then 
extended to include a home production in a similar fashion as our paper, so that the 
individual will solve     
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where hth  is the number of hours devoted to household activities. This specification 
allows for the disutility of home production, but it does not address the role of home 
production in the production process of consumption.  This model captures the disutility 
of cooking dinner at home, but it ignores the fact that cooking is part of the production 
process of consuming dinner at home.   
Nevertheless, the estimating equation for the home production model is similar to 
the standard model.  It is given by 
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In general, 0 will be a function of the parameters including the wage, so 
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The first term in the expression above represents the change in labor supply due to the 
income effect and the second term is the change due to the substitution effect.  Rupert, 
Rogerson and Wright (2000) assume that 0  is exogenous and constant across all 
individuals, which is restrictive, but reasonable for their purposes because they were 
mainly interested in the substitution effect.  Once home production is added to the model, 
they find that the Frisch elasticity is 0.297.   
 Another model that was estimated is similar to our model in that the individual 
solves the slightly different dynamic optimization problem, which is given by 
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Under this specification, the htmtt hhH   represents the leisure good and the disutility 
of working manifests itself indirectly in the leisure variable as opposed to the previous 
model where leisure is indirectly measured as the disutility of working.  The labor supply 
Frisch elasticity for the standard model was 0.106 and the home production model was 
0.306.  The slightly more complicated home production model had larger estimates for 
the labor supply elasticities over a large number of different specifications for the 
standard models and home production models, respectively.   
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Model 
 Returning back to our model, consider an optimization problem where the DM 
simply solves a series of static optimization problems given by  
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where tN  is the non-labor income and tp  is the price level for consumption.  The FOC 
of this problem allow us to estimate the parameters of the utility function by running the 
regression 
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 As in Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000), we will aggregate the data by age  
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where the variables have been averaged over the age of each person.  The reason for this 
procedure is that we so not have a true panel data set, so we assume that individual 
heterogeneity can by removed by averaging over age.  In all of the models presented in 
this chapter, instrumental variables will be applied, the details of which can be found the 
data section.   
 As noted above, the elasticity of leisure with respect to after tax wages is not 

1
 
as one might expect at first glance because income is also a function of after tax wages so 
that 
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However, we can still calculate the labor supply elasticity with respect to wages, 
which will result in a very similar expression 
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where 
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is the  ratio of labor earnings to total income and  
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 is the ratio of virtual labor earnings, which the DM would have 
received if their leisure hours were sold in the market place as labor, to full income.  
Notice that when 1mtS or 0LtS , then the Marshallian elasticity will be very small.  In 
any given period, it seems reasonable that labor income represents a large proportion of 
total income, so it should be no surprise that many studies find negligible Marshallian 
elasticities.   
  While the wage elasticity is interesting on its own terms, the focus of this paper 
is on the way labor supply changes with to respect to tax changes, not wage changes.  
However, there is a simple relationship between the two types of elasticities.  First note 
that the after tax wage elasticity is the same as the before tax wage elasticity  
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This allows us to express the tax elasticity in terms of the wage elasticity 
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This result simplifies are efforts considerably because we can proceed by deriving the 
wage elasticity for various models and then multiply by a tax factor that will vary by time 
and country.   However, even if two countries have the same wage elasticity, the tax 
elasticity will be greater for the country with greater taxes.  It is also worth noting that a 
tax rate of .5 is an interesting watermark to avoid for governments to avoid because 
1
1

 t
t


 for 5.t .  This implies that the tax elasticity will be greater than the wage 
elasticity whenever the tax rate is greater than .5 and the opposite will be true for tax rates 
less than .5. 
The Marshallian elasticity is not the only measure of labor supply elasticity.  The 
Marshallian elasticity implicitly includes the substitution and income effects.  It is also 
interesting to remove the income effects and focus solely on the substitution effects, 
which is given by the Hicks elasticity.  To derive the Hicks elasticity, recall that we can 
use the Slutsky equation to write 
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where  Hmarkete  is the Hicks elasticity.  The Hicks elasticity is a compensated elasticity that 
accounts for the change in income that occurs with a wage change.  We can still appeal to 
our implicit differentiation approach to write  
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A series of static problems optimization problems can be extended to a full 
dynamic optimization problem with savings by having the DM solve  
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where tb  is the net borrowing rate in period t which must be repaid in the next period at 
the market interest rate, r , and tN  represents non-labor income which can include 
capital income, transfers, gifts, etc.  We assume that the discount factor is normalized so 
that  
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This is assumption can be made without any loss of generality because this assumption is 
equivalent to rescaling the utility function be a factor of 
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1 1T
.  Clearly, the entire 
time endowment will be used at a maximum, so we can eliminate leisure and form the 
full Lagrangian, which will be given by 
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Examining the FOC for tb , we find the relation 
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 This is the classic inter-temporal optimality condition that determines the time path of 
the Lagrange multiplier, which is given by 
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Assuming an interior solution, the FOC for time t  labor supply results in the 
following relation 
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which is the same result as in Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000), however, with a little 
more work we can improve upon this result.  The FOC for tc  and 1tc  will be given by 
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Taking the ratio of these two expressions, consumption can be written as  
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which is consistent with a balanced growth path for consumption.  If we assume that the 
solution to this problem is continuously differentiable, then we can solve the problem 
iteratively by eliminating a subset of the choice variables and solving the new smaller 
optimization problem.    
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 Since we know that consumption expenditures grows at a constant rate of  r1  
and the langrage multiplier decreases at a constant rate of 
 r1
1
, then we can eliminate 
these variables form the optimization problem and solve the new problem 
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where     111  tttmtttt brbNhwI   is total income at time t including the 
borrowing position.  It is clear from this relationship that we can estimate the parameters, 
but as mentioned previously 0  will be a function of the tax rate and other parameters.  
However the constraint will now be binding for 0c , so the FOC for the constraint will be 
given by 
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 is the discounted lifetime wealth of the individual.  It should be 
pointed out that these are nominal quantities because we included price levels in the 
original problem and they were washed out of the model, so the inflation rate does not a 
create any labor supply distortions.   Our final optimization problem can now be specified 
without the nuisance constants as 
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This allows us to write the FOC for labor supply in terms of lifetime wealth 
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It is important to notice that this approach predicts retirement from the labor force.  To 
see this note that at a corner solution  
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If we assume that there is some point during one's career, where wages stop growing or 
simply grow at a rate that is strictly less than the growth rate of consumption, which is 
 r1 , then eventually there must be some time period rt  such that  
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Because by assumption 
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and the rest of the terms are time invariant, 
so there will be some time period, rt , where work drops to zero and it will continue to be 
zero for all periods after that point.  It is important to note that this retirement effect will 
only occur when   11  r  because wages can only fall to the minimum wage and 
  tr1  will be decreasing in time, so we have implicitly assumed that   11  r , but 
this assumption can be tested.  The special case 1  is quite informative because it 
allows for a closed form solution of labor supply given by 
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where R is the ramp function and H is the heavy side step function.  This shows the 
retirement effect quite clearly as 
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 is increasing in time, so eventually the ramp 
function is binding.  Another interesting quantity is the summation term in the solution, 
which we will call 
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This relation can be interpreted as the value of a human life.  Before one enters the labor 
force, the value of their life is the discounted value of transfers.  The value of life during 
childhood is simply the discounted value of money the parents spent to raise their child.  
Likewise in retirement, transfers, including social security and investments, represent the 
annual value of life.  During active working years, the total time endowment is used as 
the measure of annual value of life in addition to transfers.  This concept will be explored 
further in later sections. 
However, at an interior solution we can rearrange the FOC to form regression 
equation of the form 
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This equation is similar to the standard labor supply estimation model except for the 
lifetime, discounted wealth, which has replaced 0 .  Under the standard approach,  
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However, it is not very reasonable to assume 0  is exogenous, but we can now quantify 
the error of this assumption because 
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 is the ratio of discounted labor income in period t to 
discounted lifetime income.  It is interesting to note that under the assumption that 
income grows at the risk free interest rate, then  
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which means the approximation 0mtS will be more appropriate in long-term 
optimization problems and it will hold exactly in the infinite horizon problem, but 
constant income growth might be too restrictive in many cases.  If we simplify the 
regression equation further, then a rather interesting result arises. 
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In perfect markets without uncertainty, the DM chooses their net borrowing 
positions so that the life-cycle paths have the appearance of the DM receiving their entire 
lifetime income, which will be discounted, and then the DM receives a stream of income 
growing at the rate  r1 .  While it may be difficult to measure discounted lifetime 
wealth from an econometric aspect, we can still get viable estimates by first differencing 
the regression equation 
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where       11lnlnln   mttmttmtt hHhHhH  which allows the interest rate, r , 
and the intertemporal substitution parameter,  , to be estimated.  This formulation also 
shows that the trajectory of leisure will be determined be the trajectory of wages.  Using 
the implicit differentiation approach the labor supply elasticity with respect to wages will 
be 
 
 
 Ltmt
Ltmt
tt
mtM
market
SS
SS
w
h
e







1
1ln
ln
 
This is expression is the same as before except mtS  has been replaced by mtS  and LtS  has  
replaced mtS , so now we are taking the ratio of labor income to total income in period t 
as opposed to taking the ratio of discounted labor income in time t to discounted lifetime 
income.  
Since we have labor supply elasticity for each individual, the average elasticity 
can be computed over all individuals, which gives a reasonable estimate of aggregate 
labor elasticity, which allows for hypothesis testing to be computed at each point in time.  
While this method doesn’t allow elasticity to be computed as an explicit function of time, 
it does allow us to see how labor elasticity has evolved over time as the tax rate has 
changed.   
  In the previous model, the DM must substitute market labor for leisure whenever 
taxes change.  However, this approach ignores the fact that people provide labor outside 
the market place that is fundamentally different from leisure.  Whenever one cooks a 
meal at home, they are a part of the production process of the meal, which is cheaper, and 
doesn’t face the same tax burden as eating at a restaurant.  In a similar fashion, as in the 
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simulation experiments, it is assumed that the DM solves a series of static optimization 
problems 
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The FOC are given by 
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These two relations will hold for all individuals.  These relations will change over time, 
but they change only in the sense that the taxes, wages, and transfers change over time, so 
the parameters, which are time invariant, can be estimated from the following system of 
equations 
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It is interesting to note that by using the relation itithit IAh
~
  the second equation can be 
rewritten giving  
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The third term on the right side of the second equation gives the hypothetical income the 
DM would have had they sold their home production labor in the open market.  If we 
assume   0,cov itit  , then the system of equations will be fully recursive, which 
means that OLS will be consistent and efficient.  As with the non-home production 
model, leisure is not directly affected by the price level; however, home production is 
affected.  Taking first differences 
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 Consider the scenario where the consumption price level is increasing while 
holding wages fixed with 0 .  It clearly cannot be the case that both home production 
and market labor supply are increasing because our leisure equation is increasing in 
income and home production and all three choice variables cannot be increasing.  Similar 
reasoning indicates that home production and market labor supply cannot decrease at the 
same time.  Under the assumption that 0 , home production is increasing with the 
price level which means market labor supply is decreasing. This assumption also implies 
that the market consumption and home production are elastic, so it is easy for people to 
evade the market by producing at home.  As people cut back on their market labor 
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supply, by moving from full time to part time or cutting back full time hours, or even 
leaving the job market, the equilibrium wage will rise.  Remembering that the 
unemployment rate is essentially labor demand shortage whereby the unemployed cannot 
find buyers for labor supply.  Firms will start to hire more people and the unemployment 
rate goes down.  However 0  requires that home production is decreasing in a high 
inflation environment because home production and market consumption are inelastic, so 
workers cannot evade inflation as much by leaving the market which means workers are 
more willing to delay retirement, become full time workers, or work harder.  This allows 
firms to cut jobs resulting in higher unemployment rates, which is stagflation.  We will 
pursue this issue further in the dynamic setting where we show that the sign of the labor 
supply elasticity with respect to consumption prices is entirely dependent on the elasticity 
between home production and market consumption. 
The estimates of the parameters of interest are not varying over time or across 
individuals, so for any given individual the labor supply elasticity at time t can be found 
by implicit differentiation giving 
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 and MHmarkete  is the Marshallian labor 
supply elasticity in the home production model.  Benhabib, J., Richard Rogerson, and 
Randall Wright (1991) showed that in the home production model whenever 0  and 
1 , home production has no effect on market labor supply decisions, which is to say 
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home production can be ignored.  First note that in the home production model, leisure 
includes home production indirectly, which means 
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which is exactly our expression for LtS in the non-home production model.  Finally 
evaluating at 0  and 1 , we find that  
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So we find that under these parameter values, home production can be safely ignored, but 
more importantly the data can be used to test the validity of including home production in 
the labor supply model. 
The sign the elasticity in the home production model is ambiguous unlike in the 
non-home production, which has a strictly positive Marshallian elasticity.  Since some 
economic studies have found evidence of a negative Marshallian wage elasticity, it is 
important that our model allows for such a possibility.  Under the non-home production 
model, we cannot make a meaningful rejection of the hypothesis that the Marshallian 
wage elasticity is negative because it is positive by construction, but the home production 
model will allow us to do just that. 
As with the non-home production model, we can use the same implicit 
differentiation approach to calculate the Hicks elasticity, which will be given by 
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If the Hicks elasticity is evaluated at 0  and 1 , we would again find that 
the home production model does not affect the labor supply decision problem. 
While the Marshallian elasticity can be negative, the Hicks elasticity must be 
positive, which we can verify by rewriting the Hicks elasticity as  
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Since 1  and 
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, the Hicks elasticity must be positive reinforcing the 
economic theory of our model.   
 The same techniques that were used in the non-home production model can be 
used in the home production model to extend the series of static problems to a fully 
dynamic setting with savings.  The dynamic optimization will be given by  
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In the previous model, it was assumed consumption and labor at time t were chosen based 
solely on the income from that period.  It will be shown that the fully dynamic model is 
essentially the same except the notion of income has changed from period t income to 
lifetime, discounted income.  First subsume the borrowing decision into income and write 
the full Lagrangian as   
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The FOC will be given by 
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where the first equation was substituted into the second  equation.  If the second equation 
and third equations are added together, the result is the following relation. 
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where tz was previously defined.  In the dynamic non-home production mode, 
consumption expenditures were growing at a constant rate, which is the same rate as in 
the home production model.  The main difference is that the DM acts as if home 
production is a consumption good being bought at the after tax wage rate.  From the 
second and third equations, it can be deduced that 
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which is equivalent to the expression for home production that was previously derived 
except income has been replaced by consumption.  These two relations allow the 
trajectory of home production to written as 
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These relations allow consumption to be eliminated and the new Lagrangian will be  
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where   httttt hwII  1ˆ  is the virtual income that would have been available if home 
production was sold in the marketplace as labor.  In this new problem, the budget 
constraint can be eliminated  
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determines the initial conditions of the dynamic optimization, so the optimal control 
policy is given by 
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 We would like to get home production in terms of the discounted lifetime income, which 
can be accomplished by rewriting the expression as 
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is the  ratio of labor earnings to discounted lifetime income.  
This relation can be used to estimate the home production parameters.  First rewrite the 
home production relation 
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Taking the logarithm of both sides and rearranging, we arrive at the regression equation 
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This equation allows  and  to be identified, which constitute all of the home 
production parameters.  
 While a constant interest rate does simplify the model, a time varying interest rate 
can be incorporated into the model relatively easily. If a time varying interest rate is used, 
everything in the model will be the same except  


t
i
ir
1
1  replaces  tr1 throughout.  
So under this specification  
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This would seem to make more sense, but if we have a 1990 survey and our oldest cohort 
is 68, then we would need interest rates from 1940 to form this lifetime discounted 
income because 1940 is the year our 68 year old cohorts turned 18.  For example 1975 is 
our earliest survey for the US, so we would need interest rate data from 1928, however, 
1954 is the earliest time period we could get for US interest rates from the OECD 
database.  So in our analysis we use a time varying interest rate and replacing any 
missing interest rates with the one that is as close as possible in time.  Using the example 
above, the 1954 interest rate would be used for the first 14 periods and the time varying 
interest rate would be used for the final 36 periods.   
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In order to find the labor supply elasticity, we need to form an implicit function of 
the wage and market labor supply, which means home production must be eliminated.  
Our recurrence relation for home production still depends on the sequence of home 
production choices, but after a bit of manipulation, it can be shown that  
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This verifies that the optimal control for home production can be written in terms of the 
market labor supply decisions made over the life-cycle of the decision maker.  This 
allows the budget constraint to be eliminated directly to produce the final Lagrangian 
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The problem has been reduced to a function of the total work, which is to say the sum of 
home production and market labor, so the FOC will be given by  
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From this relation, the optimal control policy for leisure will be  
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Using this relation, we can estimate  and  r1 by running the regression 
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Since our data set is cross-sectional, iRˆ  is not computable at the individual level, but we 
can aggregate the data by age which will allow us to calculate the discounted, lifetime, 
virtual income.   
All other things being equal, we can see that leisure will not grow at the same rate 
as home production.  Nevertheless the time constraint can be used to deduce a relation for 
market labor supply 
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where  xR  is the ramp function.  This shows the retirement effect discussed earlier.  If 
leisure or home production increases over time, eventually market labor drops to zero and 
the decision maker retires.  If market labor is positive, there is a certain minimum of 
hours that need to be worked in order to make it a worthwhile for both parties.  This 
minimum is hasn’t been included in the model, but this issue does have distortionary 
effect in the market.   For example childrearing is a very time intensive home production 
activity especially when the children are young.  The large increase in home production 
demands can drive people out of the labor market because they need to decrease their 
labor supply below the minimum requirement.  Of course, women are disproportionately 
affected by this phenomenon.   If we are considering a minimum of hours, minmth , that must 
be met in order to stay employed, there is a differentiation in unemployment. 
 Suppose a worker is earning a wage that is below the market rate for their skill 
set.  In this scenario, we can model this scenario as a worker having a permanent wage 
cut.  At this new wage the worker would like to decrease labor supply, but the minimum 
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number of hours effect may force the worker to look for a job with better pay or hours.  
This can be considered frictional unemployment because the worker would remain 
unemployed if the old job was available, provided the expected loss of wages during the 
job search is less than the expected gains of a better job.  However, if the worker is laid 
off by the firm, then the worker would be utility maximizing under the old job conditions 
which allows us to write unemployment as 
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where Simth  is the quantity of labor that the worker would like to supply given the current 
parameters.  The first term is the frictional unemployment and the second term is 
structural unemployment.  The second term is of more interest from an economic 
perspective, but this approach does provide an intuition on how to separate these two 
effects.   
The natural unemployment can be computed simply as the proportion of the 
unemployed that would accept the same job at a different firm in a similar location.  The 
unemployment survey could be altered to ask if the respondent would accept the exact 
same job at a different firm.  If the answer is in the affirmative, then the respondent is 
structurally unemployed.  If the answer is in the negative, then worker is searching for 
better opportunities and should not be included in the natural rate of unemployment.    
These quantities can be estimated and our general approach could be generalized to 
include unemployment in future research.  
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While these relations for leisure and home production are not closed form 
solutions, they do provide a functional form that can be estimated with standard 
econometric tools.  After applying the method of implicit differentiation, we arrive at the 
Marshallian labor supply elasticity for the home production model. 
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While this expression can be negative, the wage elasticity will be positive for 
virtually all of our results.  As discussed earlier, the change in labor supply with respect 
to consumption prices is intimately tied to the elasticity between home production and 
market consumption.   
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Here it is much more clear that labor supply and prices will move in the same 
direction whenever 0 .  Correspondingly the labor supply will move in the opposite 
direction of prices.  The surprising result is that when 0 market labor supply is 
unaffected by price levels.  This clearly shows the distortionary affects created by 
inflation whenever home production is relevant.  Furthermore It can be easily verified 
that whenever 0 and 1 , the home production elasticity will coincide with the non-
home production elasticity in the fully dynamic model.   
56 
 
In order to eliminate income effects, the Hicks wage elasticity can be computed as  
     
   
0
1
1
111
1
1
1







 




























 




htLtmt
t
tt
Lt
T
i
hi
t
ht
t
tt
htLt
HH
market
SSS
z
w
SSS
z
w
SS
e





 
While this expression may appear to have an ambiguous sign, it is a simple 
exercise to verify that the Hicks elasticity will always be positive.  Examining the 
differences between the static and dynamic problems, it becomes apparent that the 
expressions are the same except the notions of income and savings are on different time 
scales.  In general the dynamic models view labor decisions through the lens income over 
the lifetime; meanwhile, the static models view labor decisions through immediate 
market conditions.   
 
Estimation 
 The majority of the data was compiled from the Multinational Time Use Study.  
Since this was an international study, there are issues with comparisons across countries, 
but this study has been harmonized so that we can make meaningful comparisons across 
studies.  Unfortunately, the harmonization creates a sparse data set as many categories we 
create are not available in all of the countries.  The wage and income data was very 
sparse, which forced us to ignore a large number of countries because wage or income 
data was not a part of their survey.  All of the surveys are cross sectional.  Even within 
surveys, there is a low response rate to wage and income questions.  While there is 
certainly a sample selection problem in those respondents that choose not to report 
income data, we do not address this issue because we were able to reproduce similar 
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results using other models that have been used in the literature, which was outlined 
previously in the literature review.  We also compared the descriptive statistics of the 
variables we used in our analyses with those from more complete national surveys and 
found that they were quite similar. 
 In the table below, different time use activities are aggregated into the relevant 
categories for our model.    
Market Labor Home Production Leisure Basic 
Paid work Cook Gardening Sleep 
Paid work at 
home 
Housework travel Dress 
Second job Odd jobs Excursions Personal care 
School/classes Childcare Sports Shopping 
Travel to/from 
work 
Domestic travel Walking Meals/snacks 
Homework/study Entertain friends at 
home 
Religious activities  
 Unpaid work at 
home 
Civic activities  
  Cinema  
  Theatre  
  Dance  
  Parties  
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  Social clubs  
  Restaurant  
  Listen to Audio  
  Watch T.V.  
  Read  
  Relax  
  Conversation  
  Visit friends at their 
homes 
 
  Other leisure  
 
 Clearly market labor, home production, and leisure cannot be the only activities 
that can be pursued.  The basic variables are subtracted from the time endowment and 
they represent activities that must be done to survive.  Gardening might be considered 
home production, but it doesn’t include farming.  Any farming activities are to be coded 
as “paid work at home” if the goods are sold.  “Meals/Snacks” was put into the basic 
variable because the labor codes didn’t include eating as part of work.    However, it is 
highly likely that there is a bit of bias introduced with this methodology, although we are 
less interested in the levels of time use.  The exchange and consumer price levels were all 
downloaded from the OECD website in 2008 US dollars.  The interest rate data is also 
from the OECD website and it is the annualized 10 year bond rate.  In cases where 
interest rate, exchange rate, or consumption price level was unavailable, we imputed the 
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missing data by using the available data that was closest in time.  The instrumental 
variables used in the regressions of all of the models are given below. 
Instrumental Variable Type 
Day Integer 
Month Integer 
Household size Integer 
Number of children Integer 
Age of youngest child Integer 
Home ownership Indicator 
Urban area Indicator 
Computer ownership Indicator 
Vehicle ownership Indicator 
Sex Indicator 
Age Integer 
Living in parent's home Indicator 
Single parent household Indicator 
Citizen Status Indicator 
Employment status Indicators 
Unemployed Indicator 
Student Indicator 
Retirement status Indicator 
Employment status Indicators 
Occupation Indicators 
Sector Indicators 
Education Indicators 
 
 These variables were used whenever they were available to be used.  Some 
countries had missing data for some of the instruments.  The time variables were included 
to adjust for seasonality and weekends. Variables relating to children and the home affect 
home production.  The rest of the variables relate to wages and labor.  Since the data is 
aggregated over age, the aggregated indicators become probabilities for different age 
groups. 
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 The 1991-1992 Germany data recorded age in five-year bands. In order to deal 
with this problem, a simple change of time scale was made so that labor was measured 
over a five-year period.  Income was assumed to be constant over five years and was 
discounted back accordingly.  Unfortunately, only 11 data points remain after this 
procedure as opposed to 51 data points for the other countries.  Unsurprisingly, the 
parameter estimates are not significant at any reasonable level, but the results are 
included. 
The next step in the process was to create a synthetic cohort.  All workers in our 
data set were chosen to be between the ages of 18 and 68 and they must have reported 
positive market labor, home labor, and leisure so that we could ensure an interior solution 
to the maximization problem.  This restriction could be relaxed in future work.  In order 
to create a synthetic cohort, we average the variables for all people of the same age:  for 
example,  
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where aN  is the number people of age a.  For the static model without home production, 
the following regression will allow us to recover the necessary parameters for the 
elasticities. 
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 Our hourly wage measure is monthly labor income divided by monthly hours 
worked, so our hourly wage variable is endogenous by design, so we proceed by using 
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the instrumental variables outlined above.  The dynamic home production model without 
home production is the same except for the income variable.  Since it is a simple 
generalization to estimate the model with a floating interest rate, then we will run the 
slightly modified model 
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The regression will be performed over the 50 years of age data that we have from the 18 
to 68 year olds.  The static model with home production will have a system of equations 
that must be estimated via 2SLS. 
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where the wage and income variables are have been adjusted for inflation and currency to 
be 2008 US dollars. The dynamic model will also have a similar system of equations that 
are to be estimated. 
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Finally the system of equations are estimated with 2SLS with the instrumental 
variables mentioned previously. 
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Results 
In the first stage of our analysis of the data, we examined the role of lifetime, 
discounted income, R, in the model.  Recall that 
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So R is the measure of market labor, investments, and transfers discounted back to 
the initial time period.  Meanwhile Rˆ  is the value of market income plus the amount of 
money that would have been earned provided home labor was sold in the market place.  
The next step is to add leisure economic value of leisure if it was sold in the market, 
which gives 
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 This is interpreted as the economic value the individual places on their working 
life, namely the ages between 18 and 68.  In the table below, the various measures are 
reported in millions of 2008 US dollars so that international and intertemporal 
comparisons can be made. 
 
Country Year R  Rˆ  R
ˆˆ
 
Canada 1981 4.5492 5.7618 7.4122 
Canada 1986 4.9806 6.2774 8.0395 
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Norway 2000 3.5298 4.0862 4.9166 
Germany 1991 4.4136 4.9715 5.6206 
Germany 1992 4.3656 4.8879 5.5094 
Germany 2001 3.2977 3.7387 4.3040 
Germany 2002 3.3504 3.7676 4.3017 
Spain 2002 5.1837 5.9392 7.2920 
Spain 2003 6.3426 7.2210 8.9272 
UK 2000 8.5950 10.0537 12.3005 
UK 2001 7.7922 9.1637 11.2755 
USA 1975 4.5597 6.8412 9.8601 
USA 1985 5.7762 7.4436 9.6133 
USA 2003 5.7494 7.6288 9.8775 
USA 2004 6.0747 7.8297 9.9176 
USA 2005 5.6025 7.2533 9.1768 
USA 2006 5.7324 7.2808 9.1530 
USA 2007 5.6225 7.0854 8.9053 
USA 2008 5.5204 6.9443 8.7199 
USA 2009 5.3823 6.7132 8.4058 
USA 2010 5.0263 6.2237 7.8291 
  
These three measures provide very similar results to other studies of the economic 
value of a life, however, our measures do not include childhood or retirement.  This 
methodology provides a simple approach to estimate the value of the remaining years of 
one's life or really any function of time that is of interest.  While it is not the focus of this 
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paper, this approach could be used as an alternative in calculating the value of human life 
in future studies.  
The estimate, R, is a measure of discounted lifetime income, which can be a 
difficult concept to understand.  It is a quantity that is not observed, but it is interesting to 
examine the role of income inequality in determining this measure.  In order to do this, 
we regressed R on the Gini coefficients and its square for each country, which gave the 
following results. 
      itititit
giniginiR  2
31.4752.3541.6
86.14934.11941.17  
Of course, this is a concave function of the Gini coefficient variables, which are 
significant at the 95% level; so, it can be maximized with a Gini coefficient of 0.3982 
with the maximum being attained at $6.35 million dollars.  The US and Spain are the two 
countries that came closest to this value in 2003 and 2004, respectively, with both 
countries showing strong economic growth in those years.  This indicates that too much 
or too little inequality devalues the average value of life.  This suggests that income 
inequality might be a quantity that governments could consider when attempting to 
regulate the economy.  It is quite interesting to note that this value is not significantly 
different from the square of the inverse golden ratio.  Of course, this relation could also 
be explored in further research.   
The table below gives the results for the Marshallian wage elasticity for all of the 
countries for which we have all of the relevant variables.  The fourth column refers to the 
elasticity in the basic model that is a series of static optimal optimization problems and 
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the fifth column refers to the basic model in a fully dynamic setting.  The fifth column 
and sixth columns refer to the static and dynamic home production model. 
 
Marshallian Wage Elasticity 
Country Year Tax Rate Static Dynamic Static HP Dynamic HP
Canada 1981 0.3429 0.0184 0.1663 0.0679 0.6687
Canada 1986 0.3814 0.098 0.331 0.2707 0.606
Norway 2000 0.5221 0.0211 0.3742 0.4302 0.7578
Germany 1991 0.5425 0.053 0.0949 -0.0485 1.0175
Germany 1992 0.5531 0.072 0.5407 -0.118 0.9664
Germany 2001 0.562 0.0844 0.1636 0.2129 0.911
Germany 2002 0.5643 0.0673 0.1582 0.0096 0.9333
Spain 2002 0.4335 0.082 0.0477 0.4558 0.7627
Spain 2003 0.4353 0.1328 0.1909 0.6454 0.9603
UK 2000 0.463 0.1785 0.1076 0.6496 1.1789
UK 2001 0.463 0.1866 0.1806 0.782 1.2359
USA 1975 0.3119 0.0558 0.0728 0.0716 0.8303
USA 1985 0.3262 0.0456 0.0273 0.2301 0.6383
USA 2003 0.3169 0.056 0.0637 0.3346 0.8907
USA 2004 0.3152 0.1092 0.0822 0.4001 0.8589
USA 2005 0.3266 0.0491 0.2117 0.3668 1.1256
USA 2006 0.3347 0.0143 0.4167 0.3479 0.8585
USA 2007 0.3433 0.0445 0.1657 0.4265 0.9624
USA 2008 0.3433 0.0486 0.097 0.3807 0.9728
USA 2009 0.3433 0.028 0.2933 0.3817 0.7794
USA 2010 0.3433 0.0342 0.2459 0.4014 1.0226  
This table shows that all of the Marshallian wage elasticities are positive except 
for the notable exception of Germany 1991-1992.  For that survey age was reported in 
five-year bands, so our data set was considerably smaller after the data was aggregated by 
age.  The general trend in these results is that the static model will have the smallest 
elasticity.  Once we allow labor to be substituted across time as in the dynamic model, we 
get an increase in elasticity again.  The static home production model allows market 
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consumption to be substituted for home production, which usually results in an even 
larger elasticity.  Finally the wage elasticity of the dynamic home production model is 
uniformly larger than all of the other models.   
Hicks Wage Elasticity 
Country Year Tax Rate Static Dynamic Static HP Dynamic HP
Canada 1981 0.3429 0.0334 0.1677 0.2795 0.6745
Canada 1986 0.3814 0.173 0.3439 0.5027 0.6336
Norway 2000 0.5221 0.0312 0.3757 0.6573 0.7609
Germany 1991 0.5425 0.0708 0.0964 0.1409 1.033
Germany 1992 0.5531 0.0947 0.5485 0.072 0.9802
Germany 2001 0.562 0.1122 0.1641 0.4123 0.9139
Germany 2002 0.5643 0.0869 0.1586 0.1883 0.936
Spain 2002 0.4335 0.1341 0.048 0.6962 0.7654
Spain 2003 0.4353 0.2172 0.192 0.9721 0.9634
UK 2000 0.463 0.2478 0.1081 0.8419 1.1826
UK 2001 0.463 0.2622 0.1814 1.0128 1.2399
USA 1975 0.3119 0.1834 0.0738 0.4395 0.842
USA 1985 0.3262 0.0846 0.0275 0.4587 0.6437
USA 2003 0.3169 0.1059 0.0642 0.6538 0.8978
USA 2004 0.3152 0.1857 0.0828 0.6965 0.8651
USA 2005 0.3266 0.085 0.2131 0.6576 1.1335
USA 2006 0.3347 0.0247 0.4195 0.6033 0.8641
USA 2007 0.3433 0.076 0.1668 0.7117 0.9688
USA 2008 0.3433 0.0832 0.0977 0.6628 0.9792
USA 2009 0.3433 0.0478 0.2952 0.6455 0.7844
USA 2010 0.3433 0.0591 0.2476 0.6677 1.0289  
Once the income effects have been removed, the static home production model 
becomes much closer to the dynamic home production model. Considering that the 
difference in the way the two elasticities are calculated is highly dependent on the scale 
of the income measurement.  In the graphs that follow, this effect becomes clear.  The 
trajectory of the static home production model appears to move closer to the trajectory of 
the dynamic home production model.  As previously discussed, the elasticity of labor 
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supply with respect to a change in the tax rate will not be the simple labor wage elasticity, 
but rather the labor wage elasticity rescaled  
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  The table below shows the Marshallian elasticity with respect to the tax rate.  Of 
course the elasticity with respect to the tax rate will be of opposite sign to the wage 
elasticity, so we report the absolute value of the elasticities to avoid confusion. 
 
Absolute Value of the Marshallian Tax Elasticity 
Country Year Tax Rate Static Dynamic Static HP Dynamic HP
Canada 1981 0.3429 0.0096 0.0868 0.0354 0.3489
Canada 1986 0.3814 0.0604 0.204 0.1669 0.3736
Norway 2000 0.5221 0.0231 0.4088 0.4699 0.8278
Germany 1991 0.5425 0.0629 0.1125 0.0575 1.2066
Germany 1992 0.5531 0.0892 0.6692 0.146 1.1962
Germany 2001 0.562 0.1083 0.2098 0.2732 1.1688
Germany 2002 0.5643 0.087 0.2043 0.0125 1.2052
Spain 2002 0.4335 0.0628 0.0365 0.3488 0.5837
Spain 2003 0.4353 0.1024 0.1472 0.4976 0.7404
UK 2000 0.463 0.1539 0.0928 0.5601 1.0164
UK 2001 0.463 0.1609 0.1557 0.6742 1.0655
USA 1975 0.3119 0.0253 0.033 0.0325 0.3764
USA 1985 0.3262 0.0221 0.0132 0.1114 0.309
USA 2003 0.3169 0.026 0.0295 0.1552 0.4132
USA 2004 0.3152 0.0503 0.0379 0.1842 0.3954
USA 2005 0.3266 0.0238 0.1027 0.1779 0.546
USA 2006 0.3347 0.0072 0.2096 0.1751 0.432
USA 2007 0.3433 0.0233 0.0866 0.223 0.5032
USA 2008 0.3433 0.0254 0.0507 0.1991 0.5086
USA 2009 0.3433 0.0146 0.1534 0.1996 0.4075
USA 2010 0.3433 0.0179 0.1286 0.2099 0.5347  
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The payoff of having low taxes is that it shrinks the labor wage elasticity.  Focusing on 
the dynamic home production model, the Marshallian wage elasticity in the USA was 
greater than unity in 2010, but the small tax rate results in a labor tax elasticity that is 
almost half of the wage elasticity.  Since Germany has tax rates in excess of 0.5, it must 
be the case that the tax elasticity is greater than the wage elasticity.  In fact the wage 
elasticity is slightly below unity for Germany, but the labor tax elasticity is inflated to a 
position greater than unity     
 
Absolute Value of the Hicks Tax Elasticity 
Country Year Tax Rate Static Dynamic Static HP Dynamic HP
Canada 1981 0.3429 0.0174 0.0875 0.1458 0.3519
Canada 1986 0.3814 0.1066 0.212 0.3099 0.3906
Norway 2000 0.5221 0.0341 0.4104 0.7179 0.8311
Germany 1991 0.5425 0.084 0.1143 0.1671 1.2249
Germany 1992 0.5531 0.1173 0.679 0.0891 1.2133
Germany 2001 0.562 0.1439 0.2105 0.529 1.1725
Germany 2002 0.5643 0.1122 0.2049 0.2432 1.2087
Spain 2002 0.4335 0.1026 0.0367 0.5328 0.5857
Spain 2003 0.4353 0.1675 0.148 0.7495 0.7428
UK 2000 0.463 0.2137 0.0932 0.7258 1.0196
UK 2001 0.463 0.2261 0.1564 0.8731 1.0689
USA 1975 0.3119 0.0831 0.0335 0.1992 0.3817
USA 1985 0.3262 0.041 0.0133 0.2221 0.3116
USA 2003 0.3169 0.0491 0.0298 0.3033 0.4165
USA 2004 0.3152 0.0855 0.0381 0.3207 0.3983
USA 2005 0.3266 0.0412 0.1034 0.319 0.5499
USA 2006 0.3347 0.0124 0.2111 0.3035 0.4348
USA 2007 0.3433 0.0397 0.0872 0.3721 0.5065
USA 2008 0.3433 0.0435 0.0511 0.3466 0.512
USA 2009 0.3433 0.025 0.1543 0.3375 0.4101
USA 2010 0.3433 0.0309 0.1295 0.3491 0.538  
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The UK has the largest wage elasticities and the second largest tax burden.  As a 
result the tax elasticity for the UK remains greater than unity and does not shrink very 
much.  For the year 2000, difference between Germany and the UK's tax burden was 0.1, 
but the factor that is applied to the wage elasticity has a difference of 0.42.  This is an 
example of high taxes creating nonlinear distortions in the labor market.  The relationship 
between the four models can be seen more clearly through a graphical approach.  The 
relationship between the four models becomes much clear through a graphical approach.  
In the following, the graphs for the tax elasticities are not included because they are same 
as the wage elasticity graphs except for rescaling.The data for Canada was only available 
for the years 1981 and 1986, so below we report the average of the two surveys.  The 
70 
 
static model doesn't include savings or home production.  The dynamic model includes 
savings, but no home production and so forth. 
Here we can see an example of the static home production, HP, model being 
below the dynamic model and there are even some points in the cohort groups that have 
the static HP model falling below the static model.  There is definitely some similarity in 
the trajectory of all the models except for the static model, which is essentially constant 
over the life cycle.  It appears as though the trajectory of the dynamic HP is most similar 
to the dynamic model without home production; however, once the income effects have 
been removed, as in the graph below, a different pattern emerges.
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 Here we can see that the static HP model moves above the static and dynamic 
models that don't include home production.  The shape of the static HP model also 
becomes more similar to the dynamic HP model. Overall all four models share similar 
peaks and valleys with the magnitude and total variation of the elasticity increasing with 
the complexity of the model. 
Canada is a North American country with relatively low taxes, so it is interesting 
to compare it to a European country with relatively high taxes such as Norway.  Norway 
is also the only European country in this study that is not in the European Union.  
 
 In the graph above, the static HP model is in between the dynamic HP model and 
the basic dynamic model for the most part.  This is slightly different from the Canadian 
graph where the static HP model was dominated by the basic dynamic model, which is 
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too say the entire static HP trajectory lies above the basic dynamic model.  A property 
that is pervasive throughout these graphs is that there is a marked increase in wage 
elasticity as workers approach retirement with the most elastic period of labor supply 
being in the last period or very near it.  In the table below, the static HP model is 
essentially translated vertically towards the dynamic HP model. 
 
 According to the theory of the model, the dynamic HP model should dominate all 
of the models, but in the first couple years of the working life this relation clearly doesn't 
hold, however, it is assumed that this is due to noise in the data set.  For virtually all of 
the data points in all of the graphs, the dynamic HP model will dominate the static HP 
model and the dynamic model will dominate the static model.  While the static model 
appears to be constant around zero, there are some small hills and valleys that can be seen 
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in the other models. The tax burden in Norway is second only to Germany, which will be 
examined in the graph of Marshallian wage elasticity presented below. 
 Here is another example of the static HP model being dominated by the dynamic 
model when the income effects are present.  The general trend of the dynamic HP model 
is increasing then it flattens out with a sharp increase as retirement is approached.  The 
other three models have a very flat appearance with a slight horseshoe trajectory.   
There is a vast difference between the dynamic HP model and the other models.  
The dynamic HP model has the intuitive property that labor supply is inelastic early in 
the career.  The labor supply is roughly unit elastic in the middle part of the career with a 
transition into elastic labor supply as retirement approaches.      
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 As with some of the previous graphs, removing the income effects results in the 
static HP model dominating the dynamic model.  However, the dynamic HP trajectory 
still displays the property of inelastic labor supply early career and, roughly, unit elastic 
labor supply during the middle of the career with a sharp increase near retirement.   
 While Spain's economy is currently doing quite poorly, the surveys in this study 
date back to 2002-2003, which is when Spain's economy was thriving well before the 
housing bubble burst.  In the graph below, the dynamic HP model displays a similar trend 
as in Germany concerning the transition of labor supply from inelastic to quite elastic.  
  
75 
 
 
 There is an unfortunate crossing between the home production models.  It also 
occurs in the model without home production.  The may be due to noise in the data or it 
may have to do with a small sample in the aggregation of age cohorts because this 
crossing only occurs during the "college" years.  
 In the graph below, it can be seen that the crossing still occurs for the home 
production models, but it is eliminated in the models without home production.  This is a 
bit concerning because the removal of the income effects usually resolves these issues, 
but this issue seems quite persistent, so this issue might be pursued in future research.  
During this time period Spain was approaching full employment during the housing 
boom, which could lead to younger workers to have a more elastic labor supply.    
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 The UK is the last member of the European Union that will be considered; 
however, the UK does not use the Euro as its currency, so it is interesting to see how the 
UK labor supply elasticity compares to the other European countries.   
In the Marshallian wage elasticity graph below, there is a very sharp spike in the 
elasticity as retirement approaches.  In fact all of the models show a strong peak in the 
early sixties followed by a drop and a huge spike after age 65.   This is markedly different 
behavior than with the other countries in the study. 
 In all of the countries except for the UK, government retirement benefits do not 
begin until age 65; however, in the UK, women are eligible for retirement benefits at 60.  
It could be the case that the first spike corresponds to female retirement and the second 
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spike refers to male retirement.  If the two genders were treated equally, we might expect 
that the 2 spikes average to one smaller spike after age 65.     
 
 
 As expected the dynamic HP model and the static HP show generally similar 
trajectories of differing magnitudes.  Unexpectedly the static model dominates the 
dynamic model.  While they are essentially the same, there is still a persistent gap 
between the two models. 
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 After removing the income effects, the gap between the static and dynamic 
models has increased.  While it may appear that the dynamic model is nonpositive at 
some points in the trajectory, it is in fact positive throughout the trajectory.   One 
explanation is that home production is a relevant variable, so the parameter estimates for 
both the static and dynamic models suffer from omitted variable bias, so inference is 
negatively affected.  Meanwhile the gap between the dynamic HP trajectory and the static 
HP trajectory has decreased as with the other countries. 
 The US is a particularly interesting example because there is far more data for the 
US as compared with the other countries in the study. 
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The static HP model and the dynamic model exhibit a horseshoe shape.  Meanwhile the 
dynamic HP is inelastic until retirement the early sixties, but the elasticity does seem to 
stabilize slightly below one before it jumps into an elastic state towards the end.  While 
the static model is essentially zero throughout the career, it is positive at all ages.  There 
is a small spike in all of the models at age 65, which can be explained by the government 
benefits that begin to accrue at that age. 
 The graph below shows similar behavior in the trajectories of the different 
models.  As usual there is large shift in the static HP model towards the dynamic HP 
model.   
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There is very little change in the trajectory of the static and dynamic models over 
the career cycle as compared with the home production models, but all of the models 
share a similar spike in elasticity at age 65.  As discussed previously, this spike is 
attributed to the government and private benefits that begin to accrue at 65.   It is much 
more intuitive that there should be significant changes in the wage elasticity over time.  
The difference in wage elasticity for a 65 year old is almost the exact same as an 18 year 
old worker.  It is quite a leap of faith to insist that 18 year olds and 65 year olds respond 
to a wage change in the same fashion. These graphs have had much less variability in the 
trajectories because for the US there were many more surveys to construct trajectories, so 
the elasticity graphs for 2007 are presented below. 
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The total variation of the trajectories has increased by a significant amount, but 
the conclusions remain essentially unchanged.   The dynamic HP trajectory still displays 
the property of inelastic labor supply early career and, roughly, unit elastic labor supply 
during the middle of the career with a sharp increase near retirement. The horseshoe 
shape remains and is amplified in 2007.  It is interesting to note that the spike at age 65 is 
not present, but it is present in the rest of the US plots.  This difference could be 
attributed to a delay in retirement due to the financial crisis that began in 2007. The 
dynamic HP model provides results that are a bit larger than standard approaches, but the 
results are more intuitive and informative. 
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Conclusions 
 In this paper, an alternative approach had been applied to dynamic optimization 
problems.  By using the method of repeated substitution, the dynamic optimization 
problem can essentially be solved as far as the econometrician is concerned.  The solution 
provided will give all of the choice variables in terms of the parameters, labor supply, and 
the borrowing position.  While the dynamics of the borrowing position have been ignored 
in this paper, it should be solvable in future research.    
As discussed earlier unemployment and retirement can be deduced incorporated 
quite easily to the model.  Since a person cannot be unemployed and retired, we can write 
the expected labor supply in time t with respect to time t-1 expectations as  
      01][ 11   mitmittttmitt hhEretirementGntunemploymeFhE  
where tF  and tG  represent the probability of unemployment and retirement, respectively.  
The same approach can be taken, however, deducing the wage elasticity will become 
quite difficult.  The benefit of this approach is that it could give insight into the roles 
inflation, wages, and consumption effects the dynamics of unemployment and retirement. 
 Even the simple dynamic model produces an alternative method of measuring the 
value of a workers life.  If attention is restricted to the case where only wages and 
transfers affect the value of life, this is R quantity analyzed previously, similar results are 
observed with other studies.  This measure determines the consumption path for each 
generation, so increasing R means that the consumption path increases as well 
corresponding to growth in the economy.    This measure is also correlated with the Gini 
coefficients of the countries under study.  The interesting result is that there is an optimal 
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of the Gini coefficient that maximizes R and that this value, 0.39.  The interpretation is 
that there needs to be a certain amount of income inequality to drive the economy, so 
there can be such a thing as too much income equality.  From time to time communist 
countries have experimented with excessive income equality resulting in very poor 
economic results. If leisure and home production is considered to have value to the 
person, viewed through the lens of opportunity cost, the value of a human life more than 
doubles.  A number of arguments could be made for the inclusion or exclusion of leisure 
and home production in measuring the value of life. 
 The static HP model produces labor supply elasticities that are generally larger 
than the basic static and dynamic models.  This is attributed to the increase in substitutes 
as the model becomes progressively more complicated.  The difference in labor 
elasticities produced by the static HP model and the basic dynamic model is largely due 
to the ease with which consumption and labor can be substituted with home production or 
across time.  If labor elasticity for the static home production model is greater than the 
basic dynamic model, then it is cheaper to substitute labor within a time period to home 
production as opposed to working more in the later stages of  the life cycle.  If workers 
are allowed to substitute labor across time and within a time period to home production, 
as in the dynamic HP model, then a nonlinear jump is observed in the wage elasticity.  
 The elasticity trajectories provided by the dynamic HP model provide a much 
more intuitive result.  It should seem odd that 18 year olds and 65 year olds respond to 
wage changes in essentially the same manner.  It would seem that young workers are 
more insensitive to wage changes and have less freedom to change their labor supply, 
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while older workers can have more freedom to change amount of hours worked and they 
can change their retirement date depending on market changes. 
 This is precisely the pattern that emerges in the dynamic HP model.  Over the life 
cycle, labor supply begins in an inelastic state becoming more elastic as experience 
grows.  Then the elasticity roughly constant around one or slightly below with an 
increase into an elastic state as the retirement age nears. 
 Returning to taxes, the wage elasticity increases as the tax rate increases, which 
means the change in the tax rate will be more distortionary in countries that have large 
tax burdens as opposed to small tax burden countries, even if the change in the tax rate is 
the same.  
However, the wage elasticity is not the relevant notion for a change in the labor 
supply with respect to a tax change, but it will be the wage elasticity times a nonlinear 
function of the tax rate.  Whenever the total tax burden is greater than 0.5, the tax 
elasticity will be greater than the tax elasticity.  Correspondingly whenever the total tax 
burden is less than 0.5, the tax elasticity will be shrunk below the wage elasticity.  The 
conclusion being that the total tax burden should be kept below 0.5 to avoid excessive 
distortions in the labor market. 
Finally the dynamic HP model is a more complicated model, but the extra 
computations result in much more informative results. This approach can be applied to 
other similar problems and generalized further in future research. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE NETFLIX COMPETITION 
Introduction 
   The Netflix project was a competition to help solve an information problem.  
Netflix is a company that rents movies on the Internet.  Customers make a list of movies 
that they are interested in and Netflix mails them those movies as they become available.  
Then the customer watches the movies and sends it back to Netflix, but Netflix charges 
only a membership fee without any late fees or rental fees.   Thus Netflix can only 
increase its revenue by getting new members or by getting its old members to upgrade to 
a more expensive membership.  For example, a customer could upgrade from two movies 
being sent at a time to three movies at a time. 
 They beauty of being an Internet company is that Netflix has a huge centralized 
collection of movies that can be distributed cheaply, but that is also the problem:  Netflix 
has so many movies that the customers are flooded with choices.  It was easy for 
customers to search for movie they wanted, but there was no knowledgeable rental store 
clerk to recommend a good drama like there was in a physical movie rental store. 
 The solution was to try to make a virtual recommendation system so that people 
could find movies that were unknown to them or maybe even a forgotten classic.  This 
way Netflix could send the customers recommended movies every time they logged on or 
added a movie to their rental queue.  Hopefully, these recommendations might also be 
added to the queue and the customer would get more movies they enjoyed.  So Netflix 
allowed its customers to rate any movie in the catalogue, including the movies the 
customer had rented or browsed.  Then the company developed an algorithm called 
Cinematch that tried to predict which movies the customer might like based on the ratings 
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of other customers.  The idea was to find a movie that John Doe might like, but hadn't 
already rented by figuring out which other customers were very similar to John Doe.  
Then for any particular movie that John Doe had never rated or rented, the similar 
customers could be used as a proxy for John Doe's preferences, thereby allowing Netflix 
to make recommendations based on the similar customers' preferences.  
   As Netflix saw it, the quality of its recommendation system was what would 
make them stand apart from future competitors, so they outsourced it to everyone.  They 
developed the Netflix Prize in which anyone who could beat the Cinematch program by 
10% in RMSE, root mean square error, would win a million dollars and publish the 
results.   
 It turned out to be quite difficult to reach that 10% improvement and took almost 
three years.  There was no single idea that won the day.   The winning team, BellKor, was 
a blend of algorithms from the most successful teams and there were 107 different 
estimators used in the winning algorithm. As Abu-Mostafa (2012) points out, even the 
winning algorithm was only a 10.06% improvement on the CineMatch algorithm.  In fact 
this bound was so tight that the second place team, The Ensemble, submitted a solution 
that tied the BellKor team, but alas it was submitted 20 minutes too late.  While the 10% 
improvement was chosen rather arbitrarily, it proved to be a monumentally difficult task. 
 The setup of the contest was to supply the competitors with three things:  the quiz 
set, the probe set, and the training set.  The training set contains data on the 480189 
customers and 17770 movies.  The movie titles are given, but for privacy reasons the 
customer names are not given.  For each customer there is a file that contains all of the 
ratings that customer has ever made, except for the ones that have been removed for the 
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quiz set, and the date of that rental.  The quiz set is a randomly chosen subset of the 
training set with the ratings removed.  The quiz set is where teams make their predictions 
and send them to Netflix.  Netflix computes the RMSE for the quiz set and sends the 
results back.  Finally, the probe set is another subset of the training set, but this time the 
ratings are not removed.  The idea of the probe set is that teams could practice with a 
similar dataset in order to hone their algorithms. 
 There were thousands of teams all over the world using all different types of 
algorithms.  To fix ideas, we present some of the algorithms other teams have used.  
 As a good first step one might consider using SVD decomposition in order to get 
a dimension reduction in the problem.  Suppose we have an m by n matrix, M, which is 
vary sparse.  Then we can use an SVD decomposition to find U and V, so that 'UVM  .  
The problem is given by  
)'()(minarg ''
),(
UVMAUVM
VU
  
where A is a matrix of dummy variables that select only the elements for which we have 
data (Németh  2007).  
 This is essentially just a factor model with L factors that estimate our missing 
data.  In general it is unclear how L is to be chosen; however, Kneip, Sickles and Song 
(2011) present a model that estimates the number of factors by utilizing cubic splines.  If 
we have some panel data set with an endogenous variable Y of size N by T and some 
exogenous variable X of size P by T, then they consider the model 
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where  t0  is an average time varying effect and  tvi  is the time varying effect of 
individual, i.  In order to insure that the model is identified we must also assume that 
there exists an L-dimensional subspace containing  tvi  for all Ni 1  with 
  
i
i tv 0 .  Then they outline a methodology utilizing a spline basis, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper, to estimate p ,1 and the time varying effects   )(,1 tvtv n  by 
minimizing  
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 over   and all m-times continuously differentiable functions   )(,1 tvtv n  with  
],0[ Tt .  There is also a test that can be performed on the size of L.  This approach is 
nice because it allows not only the factors to be estimated, but also the number of factors 
to be used.   
 While the previous model examined methods to estimate time varying effect, we 
might also be interested in the spatial relationship of effects.  Blazek and Sickles (2010) 
investigate the knowledge and spatial spillovers in the efficiency of shipbuilding during 
World War II.   
 Suppose we are producing a ship, q, through some manufacturing process, which 
takes L units of labor to produce one ship.  In many manufacturing settings, there is an 
element of learning by doing based on experience, so  assume that shipyard, i, in region,  
j, learns to build ship, h, according to the equation   

hijhij AEL   
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where A is a constant, hijE  is the experience of shipyard i in region  j that will be used in 
the production of ship h and 0 represents a parameter ensuring that the number of 
labor units to produce a single output good is decreasing as experience increases.  
Unfortunately experience is not a measurable quantity, so an econometrician might use 
the total amount of output as a proxy for experience so that 


hT
m
ijm
O
hij qE
1
 which is the 
total cumulative output of shipyard i up until the time that the production of ship h will 
begin.  However, shipyards within any region are likely to be hiring and firing workers 
from the same labor pool, which means we should expect experience spillover across 
shipyards within a region.  Of course we can represent this learning spillover within a 
region as   
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This is just the cumulative experience of the entire region j without the experience of 
shipyard i so that we capture the effect of the other shipyards in the region.  Finally there 
could also be learning spillovers across regions which can be represented as  
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 In an estimation context, the problem can be represented as a production frontier 
problem. 
hij
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where i  is the fixed effect of shipyard i and hijv  is iid normal with mean zero and 
variance 2V .  However, this model doesn't incorporate the inevitable inefficiencies that 
occur in any manufacturing process such as new workers or changes in wages.  Blazek 
and Sickles (2010) model this inefficiency with a nonnegative random variable, hij , that 
represents the organizational forgetting that occurred in the shipyard.  Their model is 
given by 
hijhij
A
hijA
W
hijW
O
hijOihij vEEEL   lnlnlnln  
hijhijhijhijhij HRwageSR   3210  
where hijSR   is the separation rate of employees during the production of  ship h, hijwage  
is the average hourly wage rate at shipyard i, hijHR  is the hiring rate of new workers for 
ship h in shipyard i and 0hij  is iid truncated normal with mean zero and variance 
2  
so hij  will be a nonnegative truncation of the normal distribution with variance 
2  and 
mean hijhijhij HRwageSR 3210   .  This model seeks to explain the learning that 
takes place to build ship by comparing firms that close to each other in terms of physical 
distance.  In our model, we will seek to find a measure of distance between customers 
and movies, but this measure is not a given parameter like distance.  This model gives us 
yet another approach to modeling the interdependent relationships that occur in real 
world modeling.   
 One of the most successful approaches to the problem was the neighborhood-
based model, (k-NN).  Suppose we are trying to predict the rating of movie i by customer 
u, call it uir .  First we would use some metric, like the correlation between movies, to 
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choose a subset of the movies,  uiN ; , that customer u had already rated that were 
"close" to the movie in question.  For simplicity only the f closest neighbors are kept, we 
would have the prediction rule 
 
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where ijw  represents the similarity between the movie i and movie j and iw  is a vector 
with f elements.  For example, it could just be the correlation between movies.  If our 
similarity measure is 1 whenever the movie is a drama and 0 otherwise, then our 
estimator will simply be the average of all the drama movies that the customer rated. 
However, the similarity weights could also be estimated in some fashion.   
A more advanced approach tries to estimate the similarity coefficients, which was 
the BellKor team's approach. The first step in their algorithm was to remove all of the 
global effects by running the regression 
  XY  
where Y is a vector of the ratings by users for different movies and X contains global 
information like movie indicators, time, user indicators, and combinations of the 
previous.  The rest of the analysis will focus on predicting the residual, uir , from this 
regression, so our final prediction will be given by  
     uiuiui rXprediction ˆˆ    
As a way to improve upon the k-NN models, a least squares approach might be 
taken to minimize the error in our prediction rule.  if  iU  is the set of customers that 
rated movie i, then for each customer  iUv  there is a subset    uiNvuiN ;,;   of the 
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movies that customer v has rated within the neighborhood of customer u.  Initially 
consider the case where all of ratings by person v are known, then the least squares 
problem can be written as.   
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 This approach gives equal weight to all customers, but we would like to give 
more weight to customers that are more influential, so they use a weighting function 
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Following Bell (2007), we can rewrite this problem as an equivalent GMM problem 
subject to nonlinear constraints 
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approach ignores some information between customers.  If we have some measure, jks , 
of the similarity between customers, then we have the simple modification 
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Previously it had been assumed that the ratings were known, but in reality the 
number of terms that determine the support for jkQ  can vary greatly within the data set, 
so a shrinkage factor was used 
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where 2f  is the number of elements in Q and   is a shrinkage parameter.  Of course we 
can repeat this process by reversing the roles of customers and movies, but it is less 
effective, however, the two different results can be combined for further improvements. 
 Instead of removing the global effects and then estimating the residuals, a 
refinement can be made that estimates the global effects and the residuals simultaneously.  
The basic problem is given by 
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where  viRk ;  is the set of the k most similar movies to movie v that have available 
ratings.  This set takes into account the information of the levels of the ratings, but 
information is also available implicitly because the act of rating a movie says provides 
information that should be utilized.    In order to use this implicit information,  viN k ;  is 
the set of k most similar movies to movie v that are rated by customer i, even if the actual 
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rating is unavailable because it is part of the quiz set.  Previously the   term was 
estimated by a fixed effects approach, but it will be driven by the data with this approach.   
An alternative to k-NN is a latent factor approach.  Paterek, A. (2007) approached 
the problem by utilizing an augmented SVD factorization model.  Under this model, the 
optimization problem becomes 
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where this sum is taken over all known customer-movie pairs with known ratings.  This 
turned out to be a very effective approach, but a refinement can be made that includes 
implicit feedback as in the previous model.   
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 Here implicit information is being applied to the user portion of the matrix 
factorization, which improves RMSE.  To get an idea on how these two different 
algorithms are combines. This approach still doesn't include the movie-customer 
interaction term of the SVD model, so the two approaches can be combined into a single 
optimization problem given below 
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This is just one example of combining two different algorithms into a single 
approach.  Over the course of the competition, many of the teams collaborated and started 
to use many different algorithms until the winning algorithm, which was composed of 3 
teams and 107 algorithms.  One of the most important lessons learned during the 
competition was the importance of using a diverse set of predictors in order to achieve 
greater accuracy. 
Case based utility is based on the idea that memories of our past decisions and the 
results of those decisions generate our preferences.  That is to say we can represent our 
preferences as a linear function of our memories.  As discussed in chapter 1, Let A be the 
set of acts that are available to the decision maker from some decision problem p.  Also 
let  Mr)q,(a,=c   be the triple consisting of the act, a, chosen in a decision problem, p, 
and the outcome, r, that resulted from the act.  For any given subset of memories, I, 
preferences can be expressed over acts conditional on those memories, which we denote 
by }{ I .  Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) prove the existence of a utility function given 
certain regularity conditions which will be represented as  
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 



Mrq,a,
q)u(r)s(p,)pU(a         
So the term ),( qps is the similarity over the decision problem given that act, a, was 
chosen. The similarity matrix will not be unique in the sense that the preference structure 
can be generated by some other similarity matrix, s~ , that satisfies  
'~ iss    
where   is a positive scalar,   is an arbitrary column vector, and i is a column vector of 
ones.  If we only consider similarity matrices that have rows summing to unity, then it 
can be shown that the possible weighting matrices must have the form 
    ''1~ iiiiss    
which means 10   because all similarity measures must be positive.  For our 
purposes the dimensions of column vectors will be quite large, so all similarity matrices 
can be approximated by 
ss ~  
where 10  .  This fact can be used to search for the most accurate similarity in a 
certain class of similarity matrices. 
 In order to see the relationship between CBDT and the Netflix problem, suppose 
vpr is the rating of movie, p, and the rating of this movie is acted out by customer, v, so 
that in our CBDT language 



Mc
vp q)u(r)s(p,r)pU(v  
where ),( qps  represents the similarity between movies p and q.  Naturally the result, r, 
will be the reported rating of movie q acted out by customer v, which means 
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q
vqvp q)rs(p,r  
In practice the similarity function will be unknown, any number of similarity functions 
can be chosen to represent the preference structure.  For example, the k most correlated 
movies could be used as weights in a k-NN type estimate that would give 
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where pqw  is the correlation between movies and 
1k
pw  is the k-1 largest correlation for 
movie p. This simply means that only the k most highly correlated movies are used to 
predict the rating. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) actually point out that the k-NN 
approach is a violation of the regularity conditions guaranteeing the CBDT representation 
of utility.  They suggest that all observations be used and simply choose small weights for 
the less similar cases.  In fact this is precisely how the Netflix competitors altered the k-
NN approach to produce more precise estimates of customer’s movie preferences.  Recall 
the early approach taken by the BellKor team to the Netflix problem.  
 
  

 












iUv vuiNj ij
vuiNj vjij
vi
w w
rw
r
2
,;
,;
min  
 
This can be interpreted as a CBDT optimization where the similarity function is learned 
from the data.  The weights are chosen to minimize MSE and there is no limit on the 
number of nonzero weights, as there is with a standard k-NN approach. 
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But we may also have a situation where there is similarity between act decision 
problem pairs.  For example, if our set of acts consists of buying or selling a stock and 
our set of decision problems consists of buying the stock when the price is high or low, 
then we may have a situation where "buying the stock when the price is low" is more 
similar to "selling the stock when the price is high" than "selling the stock when the price 
is low".  Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) provide axioms that allow a generalization that 
includes similarity over the pair of decision problems and acts by 
 



Mrb,q,
b))u(r)(q,a),w((p,U(a)    
This generalization allows for cases and acts to be separated.  There are many 
possibilities, but Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) provide a multiplicative approach that 
satisfies the necessary axioms.  It was presented as 
        bawqpwbqapw ap ,,,,,   
Since the weights are positive, the negative logarithm can be taken of both sides to derive 
an additively separable similarity function given by 
        bawqpwbqapw ap ,,,,,   
This is the similarity function that will be used in our model.  As before the utility of any 
result is simply the reported ratings of a movie, so 
 
 



Mqb,
bqapap rb)(a,wq)(p,wr  
where apr  is the rating provided by customer, a, for movie, p.  Recall that the movie 
represents the decision problem and the customer represents the act of providing a rating.  
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This weighting function would have been difficult to implement in practice, so a first 
order approximation was used. 
 
b
bpa
q
aqpap b)r(a,wq)r(p,wr  
This weighting function keeps only the most informative movie ratings, which are 
presumably the ratings made by customer, a, for other similar movies.  Similarly the 
ratings of movie, p, are weighted by the most similar customers.  By assumption 
1),( xxw , this fact can used to rewrite the multiplicatively separable weighting function 
can be written as 
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If the third term is dropped, the equivalence can be seen, but a generalization of our 
model that will incorporate this functional form will be given later.   
 
b
bpa2
q
aqp1ap b)r(a,wq)r(p,wr    
As discussed previously, we are interested in the class of weighting matrices that have 
rows summing to unity.  As previously demonstrated the weighting matrices will not be 
unique, but all of the qualifying matrices can be represented with the functional form 
above as long as the restriction 10 21    is imposed. Finally our CBDT based 
model will have the functional form 
  
b
bpa
q
aqpap b)r(a,w1q)r(p,wr   
with 10   .  The details of how such a model can be implemented to predict movie 
ratings in the Netflix competition will be discussed below.  
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Model 
This model began as a class project at Rice University.  Naaman, Dingh, and 
Taylor (2012) used this class project as a springboard to develop a full-scale algorithm 
for the Netflix competition.  Most of the algorithms focused on using only the 
information between movies because there were so many more customers than users and 
each movie has much more data than each customer, which is clearly more effective than 
just using information between customers.  We wanted to directly incorporate this 
symmetry into our algorithm instead of trying to mash two different results together.  
What set our algorithm apart is that it tries to combine the two sides sort of like digging a 
tunnel from both sides of the river instead of just one side. However, the trick was to 
make sure the tunnel met in the middle. 
In calculus one can represent a function at any given point by using the first 
derivative of the function evaluated at some other point suitably close.  This concept 
guided are thinking in that we could take an expansion of the customer's preferences 
around a particular customer-movie pair by choosing a small neighborhood of customers 
and movies that were in some sense "close" to that customer-movie pair.  This seemed to 
point us in the direction of spatial regression and case based utility. 
Suppose that we have an 1N  vector of endogenous variables y and that there 
exists some linear expansion of iy  in terms of the other endogenous variables so that we 
can write 
i
j
jiji ywy   with   0iE   
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In the context of spatial regression, we interpret the weights as being a 
representation of a point on a map using other landmarks on that map. So it seems 
reasonable to assume that this is a convex representation, 0W with  
j
ijw 1  for all i. 
These weights might be the result of some other estimation procedure, which is not 
pursued in this model.   Previously examples were given where some sort of weighted 
least squares subject to constraints estimated the weights.  Switching to matrix notation, 
we can write 
 YWI )(  with   0E   
However, this problem is not identified because WI   is not invertible due to the 
fact that 1 is an eigenvalue of W .  But if we assume that there also exists a scaling factor 
10   , then we are assured that   1 WI   exists and we will have the expansion 
   221 _)( WWWIY  
Under these conditions, we are also assured that   1 WI   will have positive entries and 
the covariance will be given by 
    12 )()'('  WIWIYYE   where   IE 2'    
This model can easily be extended to the case of an kN  matrix X of exogenous 
variables 
  XWIYWI )()(  
The reasoning behind this extension is simply that the exogenous variables should 
contain the same spatial structure as the endogenous variables in order for the model to 
make sense.  If we assume normality, then XY   will be multivariate normal with zero 
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mean and covariance given by )()'(2 WIWI   .  This allows us to write down the 
log-likelihood as 
         XYWIWIXYWINL  ''
2
1
ln2ln
2
ln 22  
Of course, we can solve this minimization problem with standard MLE 
techniques.  However, the WI ln  term must be computed at each iteration of the 
nonlinear optimization problem, which can prove to be numerically expensive.  Ord 
(1975) showed that the Jacobian determinant term of the likelihood can be written as 
 


n
iWI
11
1lnln   
where  nii 1, is the set of eigenvalues of the spatial weighting matrix.  If we appeal 
to the Schur decomposition of a matrix, in general W will not be symmetric, which allows 
us to write TQSQW  where S is an upper triangular matrix with the eigenvalues of W on 
the diagonal of S and Q is an orthogonal matrix. 
  SIQSIQQSIQWI TT   lnlnlnln  
The result follows when we realize that SI   is an upper triangular matrix with a 
diagonal entry iiiS 1 , so the result follows and we have much faster computation.  
However, Anselin and Hudak (1992) do find evidence for numerical instability for 
eigenvalues in matrices with more than 1000 entries, but for our purposes all of our 
weighting matrices will not be so large.  This basic model can be extended in many 
different directions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, but details can be found in 
Anselin (1988a).   
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This approach made sense to us because we felt that correlations could be used as 
a measure of distance between customers and movies.  If we had some meaningful 
weighting matrices that represented the "distance" between movies and customers, then 
we could apply some spatial regression techniques to reduce RMSE.  However, we 
couldn't find anything in the literature that matched up with our needs, which meant our 
approach was ad hoc and the result of trial and error.   
The first step was to take correlations between movies over the customers that had 
rated both movies and take correlations between customers over the movies they had in 
common.  However, this does not give a good measure of similarity because two 
customers may only have one movie in common which tells us little about how similar 
their preferences are, so the correlations are weighted based on the number of matches 
two customers or movies had. So if customer u has rated p number of movies and 
customer v has rated q of the movies that customer u has rated, then the weight for the 
correlation would simply be 
sq
q

 where s is a scaling factor that could be p or just a 
parameter.  However if the scaling parameter depends on p, then the weighted correlation 
matrix will be asymmetric because the weight for the correlation between customer u and 
customer v would still be given by 
sq
q

, but the scaling parameter would depend on 
how many movies customer v has rated.  We decided to leave s as a global scaling 
parameter so that when z is large the weight will be close to unity and when z is small the 
weight will scale the correlation down to zero.  It made sense that if two customers had 
rated a large number of movies, but they only had a couple movies in common, then they 
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were probably not very similar and the high correlations were due to the small sample 
size.   
 The next global step of our model was the same as most of the other competitors 
and that was to get rid of the fixed effects. Let uir  be the rating that customer u gave to 
movie i with the convention that ur  is the average rating of customer u over all the 
movies that customer u has rated; and ir  is the average rating of movie i over all the 
customers that have rated movie i; and r  is the grand mean which is the average rating 
over all customers and all movies.  This leaves us with the residuals given by 
    rrrry iuuiui  
We also tried a random effects model, but that did not perform as well as the fixed 
effects approach in terms of out of sample RMSE.  Some other panel techniques were 
also applied, but they provided no improvement in out of sample RMSE.  But the rest of 
our model will be working with the residuals of the fixed effects model.   
If we are trying to predict the rating of customer u for movie i, then the next step 
is to choose a cluster of similar movies and customers.  For customer u we choose the c 
customers that had the largest positive correlation and had rated movie i, but c was 
capped at thirty in order to make the problem numerically feasible.   Repeat this same 
process for the movie cluster so that we have weighting matrices given by cW  and mW , 
which are square matrices of possibly different sizes.  The rows of the matrices are 
ordered by the level of correlation so that the first row of cW  corresponds to customer u; 
and the second row corresponds to the customer that is most correlated with customer u; 
and the third row corresponds to the customer that is the second most correlated with 
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customer u and so on.  The rows of mW  are ordered in a similar fashion.  Finally we 
standardized the rows of mW  and cW  to sum to unity which is the standard approach in a 
spatial regression. 
We have a panel of mc*  data of residuals, which can be stacked giving 
cm
c
m
y
y
y
y
Y



1
1
11
  
If we let   mcmc WIIWW   1 , then the model can be written 
 
In a spatial regression, the parameter   is a scaling parameter that is restricted to be 
between zero and one.  In that spirit, we also restricted the parameters to sum to less than 
one, which allows the above representation. If such a representation exists, then the 
scaling parameter,  , can be interpreted as the probability the given customer-movie pair 
can be represented as a weighted sum of the most similar users and 1 is the 
probability that the customer-movie pair is represented as a weighted sum of the most 
similar movies. 
Finally we are ready to minimize the log likelihood,  
   YWIWIYWIL cmcmcm  ''
2
1
ln  
WYY
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where   mcmc WIIWW   1 .  In order to improve the speed of this nonlinear 
optimization problem, we can again appeal to the Schur decomposition of a matrix.  Let 
'PPTW cc   and 'QQTW mm   where P and Q are orthogonal matrices with cT  and mT  
being upper triangular matrices with the eigenvalues of cW  and mW on the diagonals, 
respectively.  This allows the WI cm ln  term on the optimization problem to be 
rewritten as 
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where  cii 1,  is the set of eigenvalues for cW  and  mjj 1,  is the set of 
eigenvalues for mW  and the last equality follows from the properties of upper triangular 
matrices.  This allows for a much quicker numerical computation of the optimization 
problem.  
Once we have our estimator, ˆ  in hand, then our prediction for the rating that 
customer u will give to movie i is given by 1)
ˆ( YWrrr iu    and we repeat this process 
for the next customer-movie pair.  We can extend this model by using the rest of the 
1* mc predictions to impute the missing data.  When we move on to the next customer-
movie pair, there might be some overlap in the predicted values of missing data, but we 
can simply average the different predictions of the same missing data point.  Then we can 
repeat the whole process using our averaged predictions for the missing data. 
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Estimation 
 The algorithm that we used in the Netflix competition begins with forming the 
fixed effects predictor and residual given by 
uiuiui
iuui
rry
rrrr
ˆ
ˆ

 
 
 In general any prediction rule can be used, but the main focus of this approach is 
to estimate the residual of the predictor.   
 The next step in the preprocessing is done by finding the weighting matrix, mW , 
for the movie effect.  Our weighting matrix is computed by shrinking the Pearson 
correlation, which means an element of the movie weighting matrix will be given by 
     
 
where ijq  is the number of common customers for movie i and j.  On the right hand side, 
we have the Pearson correlation over all of the common customers for movie i and j. On 
the left, we have our shrinkage factor, which will be 1 whenever 480189ijq .   
This means there will be very little shrinkage for a large number of common customers.   
Conversely the weight will be essentially 0 whenever there are few common customers to 
support the correlation as a measure of similarity.  In a similar fashion, the customer 
weighting matrix is calculated as 
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Once these matrices are formed, the last step of the preprocessing is to find the 
eigenvalues of the weighting matrices so that the log-likelihood can be written as  
      YWIWIY cmcm
c
i
m
j
ji 
 
''
2
1
11ln
1 1
  
From this point   can be estimated be a simple line search.  Since we are only interested 
in prediction, the asymptotic distribution of our estimator was not worked out, but 
bootstrapping the standard errors is feasible, but it was not computationally feasible for 
our large data set.  Once the estimate is in hand, the prediction for the quiz set can be 
made for the rating of customer c for movie m. 
1.... )
ˆ( YWrrrr mc
pred
cm   
There will now be cm-1 other predictions which can be used to impute the missing data, 
so this predicted rating will replace any missing data.  If there is already a prediction 
from some other regression then the predictions will be averaged. The number of 
predictions that have been made will be saved so that the averaging can always be done 
over all of the predictions that have been made for any missing data point.  Of course if 
the data is not missing, then there is no need to predict it.  This whole procedure is then 
repeated creating a new predicted rating until we achieve convergence in RMSE over the 
probe set.  After convergence is reached, all of the predictions can be submitted for the 
quiz set. 
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Results 
 In order to get an idea about the relationship between the movie and user effects, 
we iteratively estimated the RMSE of the different fixed effects.  First we calculated the 
RMSE just using the overall mean as our predictor; then we added the movie effect to our 
estimator; and finally, we estimated the RMSE over the full fixed effects model 
consisting of customer and movie effects. 
 
Predictor RMSE Improvement 
Overall mean 1.130 NA 
Movie mean and overall mean 1.053 0.077 
Customer mean, movie mean, and overall mean 0.984 0.069 
  
The main thing to notice about the table above is that adding the movie effect 
produces a larger improvement than adding the customer effect to our predictor.  Since 
there are many more customers than movies, it stands to reason that the movie mean is a 
more robust predictor than the user mean because on average there are many more 
customer ratings for any given movie than movie ratings for any given user due to the 
discrepancy between the number of movies and customers.    
 We wanted to know the effectiveness of the different parts of our model running a 
linear regression over our actual RMSE that came from running our model over the entire 
probe. 



9
1`i
jijij zRMSE   
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Independent variable Estimate 
Grand mean 
 00100.0
00010.
  
Movie mean 
 00102.0
11608.
 
User mean 
 00107.0
0.04138
 
Lambda 
 00113.0
 0.02369-
 
Number of ratings in the mc*  data set 
 00118.0
0.08695
 
Average of the first row of mW  
 00194.0
0.13912
 
Average of the first row of cW  
 00154.0
0.03404 - 
 
Average of all of mW except for the first row  
 00193.0
0.10803
 
Average of all of cW  except for the first row 
 00147.0
0.03275
 
  
 The user mean was not nearly as effective as the movie mean in explaining a 
small decrease in RMSE of the model and the grand mean was less effective than both 
the movie mean and user mean.  This falls in line with the experiences of the other 
111 
 
competitors.  In fact, most of the competitors used a movie centric approach which 
exploited the robustness of the between movie effects.  The next thing to notice is that the 
spatial weight, lambda, is negatively correlated with RMSE, so there is strong evidence 
supporting a spatial approach.  As expected the number of ratings in the data set is also 
negatively correlated with RMSE, which simply indicates that the model improves as our 
data set fills up with actual ratings. 
 In our model, the single most effective factor was the average of the first row of 
mW  which is the average weight given to the most similar movies that have been rated by 
the customer in question.  As we have more highly correlated movies, the average of the 
first row of mW  increases which leads to a decrease in RMSE in terms of conditional 
expectation.  As we saw with the customer mean and movie mean, the movie effect is 
more relevant than the customer effect, but the model is improved by combing both 
effects.   
It seems counterintuitive that the average entry of cW  and mW , excluding the first 
row of both matrices, is positively correlated with RMSE.   However, this is really a 
measure of the similarity between the movies and customers that we are using as a basis 
to make out estimate for any given customer-movie pair.  In essence, there is some 
overlap in our neighborhood of customers and movies.  Ideally we would have a set of 
movies or customers that is very similar to the rating we are trying to predict, but the set 
of movies or customers themselves are not very similar to each other.   
 
 
112 
 
The final RMSE for our model over the probe set is given in the table below with 
some naïve models as well. 
Predictor RMSE Improvement on Cinematch 
Overall mean 1.130 -17% 
Movie mean and overall 
mean 
1.053 -15% 
Customer mean, movie 
mean, and overall mean 
0.984 -2% 
Cinematch 0.965 0% 
Spatial Model (Probe Set) 0.93 3.76% 
Spatial Model (Quiz Set) 0.88 8.8% 
Winning Algorithm 0.865 10.006% 
 
This is very close to the 10% improvement that we would need to win the Netflix 
competition; however, this result is for the probe set which was for practice.  When the 
algorithm was applied to the Quiz set, the RMSE was 0.92 which was a 4.7% 
improvement on the Cinematch algorithm which was well short of the 10% improvement 
needed to win.  Despite our best efforts, we were never able to explain the discrepancy in 
accuracy between the two data sets.  
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Conclusions 
In the Netflix competition, we found significant improvements in RMSE by using 
a spatial model approach that incorporates the interrelationship between movies and 
customers.  One drawback of this approach is its computationally difficulty, but the 
computational burden can still be handled by most data sets that are encountered in the 
field and by a judicious choice of the maximum size of the neighborhood used to make 
predictions.  
There are also future extensions to this model by using more advanced weighting 
matrices.  One possible future improvement of this model would to use a more 
complicated weighting matrix.  Recall that the multiplicatively separable model can be 
written in SBDT form as 
   
 
   



paM/,
bqap
M,
bpa
M,
aqpap b)r(a,wqp,wb)r(a,wq)r(p,wr
qbpbqa
 
In this paper, the final term was dropped resulting in an additively separable 
model; however, the model can be generalized to a multiplicatively separable model in 
the following way.   
 
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where  cii 1,  is the set of eigenvalues for cW  and  mjj 1,  is the set of 
eigenvalues for mW . This approach resulted in a smaller RMSE on a subset of the 
probe, but it was not pursued any further and may be revisited in future work. 
Further improvements seem quite likely if the weighting matrices are estimated 
via the more complicated methods presented earlier. One could also use a kernel 
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approach to estimate the similarity matrices, but the asymptotic theory of such an 
approach are beyond the scope of this paper.  This approach can be applied to other panel 
data sets as another approach to take into account the relationship between effects and aid 
in making predictions.  While this approach may not have been as successful as some of 
the other Netflix algorithm, we believe that it can provide a refinement to existing 
recommendation system algorithms.  Spatial regression approaches have typically 
focused on a single dimension of spatial correlation.  Our approach has demonstrated a 
novel approach to estimating models with more than one type of spatial correlation.  
Finally one of the greatest lessons of the Netflix competition is the emphasis on multiple 
approaches being combined to provide more accurate predictions of customer's 
preferences. 
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